

CORRESPONDENCE RE H.R. 2319 and H.R. 3469

April 2, 1947.

The Honorable James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

You will recall that on February 27th, in reply to an inquiry from me, you wired that no orders had been issued to the members of the Naval Service to support the agreement made by yourself and the Secretary of War, relative to the pattern of merging the military forces of the nation.

In private conversation with Naval officers, I find that there is a general feeling of reluctance among them to speak critically of the proposed plan. This feeling is so genuine that they refuse to express themselves even in private conversation and certainly will not be critical in any testimony they might give to a Committee of the Congress on the question.

I am sure that you agree with me that any fundamental reorganization of our military establishment is of so grave importance that its implications should be explored and considered thoroughly from all angles before a change is made. To the extent that career officers of the military services withhold their views on the problem, especially those which may be critical of the proposed plan, to that same extent full and thorough consideration is denied.

Accordingly, if it is the fact that Naval officers are free to express their views on the question, I think it highly desirable for you to make suitable expression, either by way of public statement or reply to this letter for purposes of publication.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) W. Sterling Cole
M. C.

NAVY review(s) completed.

16 April 1947

The Honorable W. Sterling Cole
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of April 2, 1947.

I wish to assure you of my whole hearted concurrence with your thought that all persons in the military service should be free to express their personal opinions on the important questions of fundamental reorganization of our military establishment.

In promulgating the agreement between the War and Navy Departments which the President announced on 16 January, I advised the naval service that the reorganization plan was deserving of the support of all within the naval service. In a later letter I expressed the hope that study and consideration of the plan would lead all in the naval service to conclude that it deserved their support.

As you know, the traditional policy of the Navy Department is that every person in the naval service is at liberty to voice his professional and personal opinion on any subject when testifying before a committee of the Congress or when engaged in private conversation.

I assure you that it is not my intention to attempt to alter this policy. I know you will agree with me that the public office which I hold in no way empowers me to abridge the constitutional right of free speech which every American citizen enjoys.

I appreciate your interest in clarifying this matter.

Sincerely,

(Signed) James Forrestal

May 2, 1947

The Honorable James Forrestal
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

This is in further reference to the question of Departmental control over the expressions of opinion by naval officers on the pending proposal to consolidate, unite or merger the armed services.

In your reply to me of April 16, 1947, you give assurance of your whole hearted concurrence with the thought that all persons in the military service should feel free to express their personal opinions on the important question of fundamental reorganization of our military establishment. Permit me to extend my genuine compliments to you for the very fair attitude which you have taken in this regard.

Now, the problem seems to be one of implementing your declaration in such fashion that officers who might be in disagreement with the merger proposal, will freely voice their thoughts without fear of reprisal. While it may be true that it is the "traditional policy of the Navy Department that every person in the naval service is at liberty to voice his professional and personal opinion on any subject when testifying before a committee of Congress", the navy regulations prohibit any officer from applying to Congress or any Committee or Member thereof for Congressional action of any kind and, further, they prohibit all remonstrances from any officer to Congress on any subject of legislation relating to the Navy or the Marine Corps except by authority of the Department. In view of these provisions of the Regulations and ALNAV #21 which states that the merger plan "is deserving of the loyal and wholehearted support of all within the Naval Service", no member of the naval service feels that he is allowed any latitude of expression. Certainly, the expressions made in your letter to me of April 16, laudable though they are in themselves, do not provide an official basis for unrestricted self-expression by navy people on the merger question.

Any legislation, so vital as this, concerning the military forces of the nation is so important that the Congress must have professional information freely given and not given under pressure. So far, in the consideration of the proposed legislation, only four professional naval officers have testified. These four have been very

closely identified with the official policy of the Navy. It is very questionable to my mind whether the official policy of the Navy truly reflects the opinion of the majority of the professional and reserve officers. It is my belief that not less than 90% of these men are opposed to this legislation in its present form - and yet they dare not say so.

I am definitely unwilling to cloak those of the services who favor the proposal with a mantle of patriotism, unselfishness and wisdom and at the same time require those who disapprove the proposal to stand naked in treason, selfishness and ignorance. Both groups must be credited with the same degree of sincerity of purpose and capacity of judgment. To be qualified to pass upon this vital matter, the Congress must have the truth and the truth cannot be had when only one side of the matter is allowed to be expressed.

It is my present purpose to make inquiry of various responsible and prominent officers of the services in an effort to learn their attitude on this question. In order that they may have the freedom of expression which they and the question they discuss deserve, I respectfully ask that the declaration contained in your letter of April 16 be embodied in an immediate ALNAV, or that the equivalent be expressed by you by letter to me which, upon publication, will free the men of the service to speak their minds. Both you and the Congress owe this much to them and the country.

The principles involved in this controversy are so profound and the issues at stake are so vital to the security of our country that no element of pride, position or ambition of any individual or group connected with it should be allowed to color either our judgment or our courage.

The Navy in years gone by has possessed a high prestige in Congress. Its great achievements culminating in victory during the war just ended has elevated its prestige to the highest position it has ever had in the minds of the people and of Congress. I do not want to see this enviable reputation lost or marred. It is, therefore, in this spirit that I am again writing to you with the hope that the same spirit will command your reply.

Very respectfully yours,

(Signed) W. Sterling Cole
M. C.

10 May 1947

My dear Mr. Cole:

Until I received your letter of May 2, I was under the impression that it was generally recognized, as I said in my earlier letter to you, that "every person in the naval service is at liberty to voice his professional and personal opinion on any subject when testifying before a Committee of Congress."

I believe that anyone reading the recent testimony of Admiral King, Admiral Halsey, Admiral Hart, General Vandegrift, and General Edson will reach the conclusion that officers of the Navy and the Marine Corps not only possess this liberty but also exercise it.

As regards private conversations, there has been no restraint laid upon officers of either the Navy or the Marine Corps and no denial of the right to express their personal views on this question. It is true that I issued an ALNAV under date of 18 January 1947 saying that support of the Bill S. 758 and H. R. 2319 would be the official position of the Navy Department and that I sincerely hoped the bills would command the support of all hands. By implication this might cause some to be reluctant to express their views in private conversations. But realistically, I doubt if this assumption is soundly based because in the cases of those persons who disagreed with the officially expressed policy of the Navy Department silence could be just as effective an instrument of disagreement as speech. In other words, I am aware that there is no way, nor should there be under our form of government, of denying the right of opinion to anyone be he civilian or service individual.

I have tried to dissuade naval personnel from soliciting the time of Members of the House and Senate to express their views on this subject because I regard it as inappropriate for members of the Services to seek out Members of Congress in order to present their individual opinions. There is a proper place for the presentation of such opinions and that is in the Committee hearings.

To sum up: There is no denial of free speech on this or any other subject to officers of the Naval Service or the Marine Corps. On the other hand, I shall continue to do my best to persuade these men that the proposed legislation constitutes a desirable and imperative improvement in planning for our national security.

Sincerely,

(Signed) James Forrestal

May 27, 1947

Dear Admiral Doe:

As you know, the Congress has under consideration a bill (HR 2319) which represents the plan of the War and Navy Departments relative to the consolidation of the armed services, pursuant to the directive of the President. In my opinion this is the most important measure to come before the Congress so far as our national defense and national security are concerned.

While it is true that the official position of the Navy Department is in support of the plan, substantial critical and apprehensive expressions on the subject have come to me from responsible persons in all of the services. As a practical matter, it is impossible for all of those who are vitally interested in this problem from the standpoint of national security to appear before an appropriate committee of the Congress to give expression to their views. Accordingly, my purpose in writing you is to seek an expression as to your judgment and recommendations with regard to the proposed plan, or an alternative plan. A copy of H. R. 2319, and also of H. R. 3469, the latter representing my own personal suggestion of an alternative, are enclosed.

I am sure that all will agree that some steps should be taken in order to bring about a closer co-ordination of army, navy and air force operations. The pattern of this step is the important factor. Because of your knowledge

Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8
of the subject and your years of service experience, I am seeking your advice.

Also, enclosed herewith are copies of communications exchanged between the Secretary of the Navy and myself with regard to the latitude of expression available to members of the service. From this exchange, I hope you will find it possible to express yourself freely and without hesitation. If it is your wish, your response will be held by me as confidential; otherwise, I shall feel free to release your expression to the Congress.

In view of the fact that action may be taken by the Congress on this subject in the near future, I hope that I may have the benefit of your reply at an early date.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) W. Sterling Cole
M. C.

P. S. What is the opinion of the men in the service on this question?

REPLIES TO COLE LETTER OF INQUIRY

"My personal conclusions are that:

"(a) Much effort and study has been put into obtaining the agreements resulting in H. R. 2319, by men of the broadest war and administrative experience, and of the highest integrity.

"(b) More good to the services and to the country is to be gained by settlement of this question, as agreed upon by our qualified leaders, in stability of organization and a resultant spirit of co-operation, than is to be gained by re-opening the study of the form such an acknowledged need for improved co-operation should take.

"In answer to your question regarding the opinion of the men of the service, my impression is that we can obtain nearly as many answers as the number of men questioned."

"My experience in the last war indicates to me that the setting up of a new, separate and distinct Air Force, as proposed by HR 2319, would ultimately aggravate the disunity which we experienced from time to time during the last war. (although I must say that I believe these instances of disunity were exaggerated). It is obvious that a separate Air Force would constitute a third entity which would engage in a struggle for prominence and authority with the Army and Navy.

"I have always felt that a good deal of the lack of unity of command in the field could have been avoided if the practice had been followed of ordering all subordinates on duty in a certain area to report to the Area Commander in the roll of subordinates, i.e., if, for example, all Army, Navy and Marine Corps Officers in Admiral Nimitz' area had received orders directing them to report to Admiral Nimitz for duty and if it were clearly understood that all such officers were in the same status and if all orders from Washington, intended for these subordinate officers, would have come to Admiral Nimitz, I believe that conditions would have been improved.

"Perhaps I am venturing too far in this belief, but that is the impression that I obtained from my travels to the various combat areas. There was too much direct communication between Washington and Subordinate Commands in the area.

"I have felt, too, that the organization of a separate Air Force must inevitably lead to additional expense without commensurate increase in efficiency."

"I feel that in the best interests of national defense, no bill should be enacted which would go beyond the provisions of HR 2319 as written, or which would extend over into the field of actual physical "merger" of elements of the armed forces or of their integral supporting services. I believe that such legislation would bring about full coordination of the functions and operations of the separate branches of the armed forces, and insure that all feasible and justifiable economies would be realized.

"I would have no objection to any reasonable alternative bill which embodies the foregoing principle which I believe to be basic, i.e., "effective coordination" without features of merger"merger".

"When I have studied H.R. 3469, I will make further reply concerning the Bill.

"With respect to H.R. 2319: I testified before the Senate Armed Forces Committee on the companion Bill, S-758, and expressed my support of that measure, with certain reservations; as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), my principal concern was with the logistical aspects of any measure dealing with unification of the efforts of the armed forces. The views that I expressed were my own, and I stated that I was not instructed.

"The hearings on S-758 later convinced me that several interpretations were being placed on the language of the Bill, and that there was no certainty that the intent of the language would be fulfilled by the Bill as written, nor maintained without infringement should the Bill, as first written, be enacted. I understand that S-758 may be modified by a preamble and certain safeguarding language designed to remove the possibility of unintended interpretations or infringement, but have as yet no first-hand knowledge of any such new language.

"I firmly believe that the most efficient and economical use of all of our national resources and strengths must be sought in these days of total war and mass destruction; however, I also feel convinced that the measures and techniques which crushed our enemies in 1945 must not be abandoned in favor of untried theories. With those two ideas in mind, I strongly support (a) the theory of effective coordination at the policy level, (b) the retention of such war-tested agencies as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Munitions Board, and (c) the autonomy of the several Services within the framework of top-policy coordination. My meager political experience limits the value of any opinion I might have as to what the organization should be for effecting top-level policy coordination, but I am prepared to state my views on logistical implications.

"I appreciate your thoughtfulness in offering to hold my response to your letter as confidential, but I do not wish to take advantage of your offer inasmuch as these are freely expressed opinions voiced at the invitation of a Member of the Armed Services Committee.

"With respect to your final question, I am unable to make any worthwhile estimate as to the cross-section of Service opinion in this matter other than to say that of those with whom I have talked there is virtually unanimous objection to merger, a single department, and the vesting in a single Secretary of any power enabling him to arbitrarily assign or change the roles and missions of the Services or their components."

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"I doubt that I will be able to make any substantial contributions or submit a proper evaluation of the proposed plan. I feel that the Marine Corps has been most ably represented before the committees of the Congress by our Commandant, General A. A. Vandegrift."

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"To me it appears perfectly legitimate for an individual to present his views in writing to a Committee or a member thereof when such action is initiated by the latter and, for whatever reason, conversations and appearance before the Committee are not possible nor desirable.

"This feature is not covered by the correspondence enclosed with your letter of 19 May. Does not clarification on this point seem to be in order if you are to obtain the free expression of views which you seek?"

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"As you suggest in your letter, no thinking person will contest the need for closer coordination of the elements of national security. The problem confronting the Nation today is that of finding an effective, economical, and democratic method of effecting such coordination. In my opinion H. R. 2319 is not a satisfactory answer to the problem.

"It has frequently been claimed in support of H.R.2319 that coordination of the military departments and the armed services can come about only through the establishment of an office with complete authority over these departments and services. The same argument might equally well be applied to any combination of Government departments which are required to closely coordinate their activities. But I have heard no demands for unification of such other departments under a super-secretary. The fact is, of course, that there is already in existence a common head for all of the executive departments - the President. If the coordination of the executive departments exceeds his capabilities, then the proper answer would seem to be to give him the necessary assistants - call them coordinators if you will - to do the job. It does not impress me as good management to inject a new echelon of command to solve every new problem of coordination.

"I regard the building of super-departments and the creation of super-secretaries as unnecessary, even undemocratic - a poor solution to a management problem and a dangerous one. The concentration of power in non-elected hands is an unsafe road for a democratic nation to follow.

"The provision for a National Security Council to serve as the principal advisory body concerned with matters of national security is basically sound, in my opinion. This is an age in which warfare directly affects every segment of the population and every element of the national life. The National Security Council should bring together the diverse viewpoints of these elements and insure that security measures truly reflect the national interests in the broadest sense. Unfortunately, the composition of the Council as proposed by H. R. 2319 is not such as to achieve this purpose. The membership of the Council must be considerably broadened if it is to do so.

"Broadening of the membership of the National Security Council would also have the very desirable effect of diminishing its military complexion. Under H. R. 2319 four of the six named members of the Council are spokesmen of the military departments. I doubt if anyone will be so naive as to assume that their viewpoint would be a civilian viewpoint.

"The Central Intelligence Agency is open to the same criticism of undue military influence. Such an agency has considerable capacity for harm unless it is under firm civilian control and its functions circumscribed by law.

"I have no comment to make with respect to the National Security Resources Board and the Munitions Board except to state that I have observed considerable difference of opinion over the relationship between these two bodies. Since this relationship involves the important question of civilian versus military control of the national economy in time of war or emergency, a concise definition of the relationship seems most desirable.

"The provision of H. R. 2319 for a War Council seems to me to be unnecessary. I can see little purpose in establishing a War Council so long as a Secretary for National Defense is permitted to exist. If that functionary were eliminated, on the other hand, the War Council could serve a most useful purpose as the agency for the coordination of the military departments. I do not regard the coordination of the military departments as a proper function either for the National Security Council, which has a broader function, or for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"The proper functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are the preparation of strategic and logistic plans, the establishment of unified field commands, and the strategic direction of the field commands. These are purely military functions, and do not extend to the administration of the military departments in any way. They are the same functions which the Joint Chiefs of Staff performed so ably in the war just ended. I regard it as essential that this body and these functions be perpetuated.

"I cannot subscribe, however, to the need for or the desirability of a Joint Staff to serve the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From my study of the history of national general staffs I am convinced that such staffs are an instrument of militarism and a menace to democratic governments. I therefore, believe that provision for a Joint Staff should be eliminated from the proposed legislation. A secretariat charged with clerical and administrative duties should adequately meet the requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for assistance in the performance of its functions.

"The perpetuation of the existing Joint Research and Development Board as the proposed Research and Development Board is a sound provision, and one which should be incorporated in any legislation for the coordination of the armed services.

"Coming now to the armed services themselves, it is my belief that an independent air force should be established under a separate Department of the Air Force. The exercise of strategic air power, including the defense of the United States and its possessions against aerial attack, should no longer be hampered by treatment as an element of land power or sea power. It is a distinct and separate element of overall military power and should be treated as such.

"I cannot subscribe, however, to any philosophy which would place all military aviation in a single air force. To do so would be to flagrantly disregard one of the most important lessons of the recent war - the lesson that the ground forces and the naval forces must each possess their own aviation components if they are to operate effectively. Close support aviation is an essential element of land power and an inseparable component of an effective ground force. By the same token naval aviation is an essential element of sea power -- perhaps the most essential element -- and an inseparable component of an effective naval force.

"The same philosophy which dictates that the naval establishment should contain the necessary aviation to make it an effective force for the exercise of sea power, also requires that the Marine Corps be maintained as a part of that establishment. History offers countless instances of the truth of this statement. There is no evidence that its validity will be diminished in the foreseeable future.

"Along with many other Marine officers who have had the opportunity to study the pending unification proposals, I am greatly concerned over the future combatant role of the Marine Corps if H. R. 2319 should be enacted in its present form. The vulnerable position in which the Marine Corps will be placed by enactment of this bill has been pointed out repeatedly in the course of the past few months. It is this position of vulnerability, coupled with expressions of intent such as those appearing in the 1478 series of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which arouses the fears of Marines and their friends throughout the country. These fears will be set at rest and their substance removed only when Congress spells out in unmistakable language the future status and functions of the Corps.

"I can offer no suggestion which would improve the statement of Marine Corps status and functions which General Vandegrift, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, incorporated in the amendment which he submitted to the Senate and House Committees considering unification. I think it would be appropriate if Congress were to enact similar statements of basic functions for all the services. I can think of nothing which would do more to promote future harmony among the services than legislation marking out for each service a clear-cut field of endeavor.

"Possessing the views which I have outlined herein, I would consider it most unfortunate if H. R. 2319 were to be enacted in its present form. It would require extensive alteration of this bill to arrive at a real solution for the problem confronting the Nation today -- that of achieving the closer coordination of the elements of national security in an effective, economical, and democratic way. I believe that the problem is solvable, however, and that a close approximation to the ideal solution has been achieved by Senator Robertson in the bill which he recently proposed as a substitute for S. 758, the Senate counterpart of H.R. 2319. I have studied Senator Robertson's bill, S. 1282, and am of the opinion that it is an admirable instrument for national security.

"I have also given careful attention to H.R. 3469 which you have offered as a suggested alternative to H.R. 2319, and I am pleased to observe that your proposal also eliminates many of the objectionable features of H. R. 2319. Inasmuch as S. 1282 coincides more nearly with my views, however, in that it provides for a War Council, establishes a separate Department of the Air Force, and spells out the functions of the armed services in what I believe to be the necessary specific terms, my preference is for S. 1282 rather than for H. R. 3469.

"In closing, I wish to thank you for the opportunity you have accorded me to express my views on this important subject. Again let me say that I have set forth my personal views -- that I do not flaunt them, neither do I have any desire to conceal them."

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"On a subject of this nature it would be necessary to interview a great many men to obtain a completely accurate cross section of their views. I will, therefore, confine myself to those things which I have heard specifically mentioned by men in discussing the possibility of unification. The majority of them agree that unity of command is absolutely necessary but the following questions invariably arise. (1) Are we justified in changing a system which worked efficiently and won the last war? (2) Is this the time to experiment and adopt a system, which, more or less, was the one used by the Axis nations and which proved a failure? (3) Will there be any real economy either in personnel or money? (4) Will it create more efficiency? (5) Will our national defense and security be improved?"

"These are questions which can only be answered in years to come, but you and the other members of Congress will have to make the decision which is so vital to the security of our country."

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"With VJ day we emerged from the most devastating war in the World's history, victorious over the strongest enemies, in both an absolute and relative sense, which the United States had ever faced. It seemed to many of us in the Navy that the nation, the home front, the Armed Services, and the Navy itself could well be proud of this achievement. It seemed to many of us that the war making organization of our country had been thoroughly tested, and within the limits of human fallibility, had successfully passed that test, and therefore required no radical change to an untested organization. It seemed to many of us in the Navy that the war had brought a high measure of appreciation and sympathetic understanding and ability to cooperate among every element of the U. S. war machine - including the civilian home front, the Army, the Army Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, naval aviation, submarines, surface ships, amphibious forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc.

"To our astonishment then, instead of an atmosphere of mutual congratulation and good will and a determination to continue the teamwork which had proved itself so successful, the Navy found itself the target of an unrestrained and intemperate attack, the object of abusive and extravagant criticism with little regard for facts, logic or reason in the charges that were made, emanating chiefly from a certain element of a sister service which apparently had devoted considerable effort, not to say expense, before V-J day to planning an anti-Navy campaign while the Navy was devoting all its energies to bringing about a successful conclusion of the war.

"My only purpose in raking over these dead ashes is to make the point that it all brought about a serious deterioration in the relations between the services, and therefore impaired their ability to cooperate, and therefore weakened the total of our military strength in the face of a serious international situation which required unity and not dissension in the United States and especially in the Armed Services of the United States. And this situation made it imperative that the wounds be healed, that some sort of compromise be reached.

"As one who had no direct responsibility and no direct part in the drafting of what has since become the substance of HR 2319, it seemed to me that, with minor reservations, this bill represented about as good a compromise as could be hoped for. I don't like it. I prefer the present organization (with legislative authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Intelligence). I don't like HR 2319, but at least it was arrived at by "democratic

process" of give and take, it was a compromise and it gave promise of restoring the brotherhood-in-arms of the various elements of the Armed Services.

"As to HR 3469, I prefer that in principle to HR 2319 though my first preference is still the present organization (with legislative authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Central Intelligence and comparable coordinating agencies in other fields). It is most important, however, that (a) the breach between the services be healed and (b) that a firm decision be reached quickly. The particular compromise, if any, which will best effect these results is the problem. If it were to be decided by a sort of Gallup poll I should vote for the present organization. Statesmanship might produce a different solution, possibly HR 3469 or HR 2319."

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"Since my answer to your letter of May 19, I have endeavored to study and compare the original Unification bill, H.R. 2319, with that submitted by you, H.R. 3469. It is my considered opinion that the Bill proposed by you will, in effect, produce far more economies, and be more conducive to the national security than the original proposed bill. I feel that the national welfare will be better served by close cooperation under a two department system, coordinated by a Director of National Defense, than a virtual three department system."

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"I am of the opinion that your bill provides the only solution to the national defense problem and that H.R. 2319 is entirely unacceptable. I have not had sufficient time to study your bill to permit detailed comment. I am, of course, familiar with H.R. 2319.

"I consider that a two department organization as envisaged by you to be the only logical guarantee for an air-sea Navy that can fulfill its missions effectively. I am of the opinion that formation of a third Department for Air will result in an unbalanced defense organization wherein ground force and Naval requirements will gradually be neglected to a point that may be catastrophic to our country. I state this advisedly as the private and public utterances of Air Force leaders leave me with no illusions as to their future intentions concerning the Navy and Naval Aviation when autonomy under their own Secretary is achieved."

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"As much of an examination of the alternative proposal, H.R. 3469, as I have been able to make in the limited time available, indicates that it will not accomplish the improved efficiency and economy of administration to the extent intended by the President to result from the organization of a National Defense Establishment administered by a Secretary of National Defense."

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"The greatest advantage in H.R. 3469 is its basic concept of a coordinated two department organization. I believe 100% in this concept for a solution of our problem.

"In the first place, a third department or a third prong to a corpulent single department cannot be accepted as representing economy. It may very well be that closer coordination will produce gradual economies in comparison with present practice but the overhead of the third department will have to be faced. The same steps of coordination are bound to produce greater over-all economies if applied to only two departments or two prongs.

"With respect to the actual coordination, the mechanical and mathematical advantage is of the order of 4 to 1 in favor of attaining success in the two department set-up where only "a" and "b" must be pulled together. In a three department set-up, the following coordination would have to be effected: ab, bc, ac and finally abc.

"If we suppose that the need for coordination could be eliminated in a real single department wherein, as one example, personnel of all branches would be controlled and detailed to duty by one Personnel Division, we would run contrary to the experience of American big business. I believe that a merger of Montgomery Ward and Sears Roebuck was once considered and given up because the result would be too corpulent for efficiency. Our military organization dwarfs any existing business corporation. Even if such a huge military organization were manageable, it would prove unhealthy by regimentation and the elimination of competition. If all automobiles were manufactured by a single concern, I doubt if anyone in his right mind would expect to obtain the best and cheapest product. Thus the two department military organization will provide maximum economy compatible with a healthy fighting machine.

"If a separate department of air is set up, I foresee a real weakening of our future military strength. I believe that this will come about with the acceptance on the part of the Congress and the public that such an air department will be the source of all expert opinion on the application of the military airplane in all fields. Competent as the A.A.F. has proved itself in its own field, it does not understand (see postscript) or believe in naval air power whereas our air power is the Sunday punch of the Fleet today. It would be a National tragedy if naval air power were relegated to an accessory role. The Navy would be crippled and as the weak link determines the strength of a chain so would a weak Navy weaken the whole organization. Neither the Army or the Navy can be very effective today without air power and for obvious reasons in order to exert maximum striking force the air power should belong to the using service. To those who demand coequal status for Air along with the Army and Navy, I say that they are on the right track but they have not gone far enough. What the country needs now is two services: a Navy which is largely a seagoing air force but complete with all necessary supporting and other components; and an Army which has its heaviest striking power concentrated in a land based air force but augmented by the necessary supporting and other components. Each of two such services represents a speciality and each is broad enough to absorb one's full career. Thus Air would achieve more than a coequal status or 33 1/3%; it would be the backbone of each service. Military history supports the above position since victory has been attained by the side which employs the dominant weapon of the times most effectively. Today the dominant weapon has proved to be the airplane. Tomorrow it may be the long range guided missile. A two department organization retains sufficient flexibility to adjust to future requirements.

"It seems to me that setting up a single air department would prove faulty in two other respects. First, such a department would be built around a weapon -- if this had occurred in the old days a department of horse, archers or spear-bearers might have been the result. The history of all weapons is transitory and the airplane can expect to be superseded in time by the long range guided missile. Second, and in the meantime, the Air Force can be expected to duplicate every function of the Ground Forces. The Air Force will require its own engineers (to build fields, roads, buildings), Artillery (AA defense of air fields), quarter-masters, etc., plus airborne troops -- it will have to develop tanks and artillery transportable by air plus the personnel to man these tools. It will also have to develop capsuled food and condensed fuels for air delivery. A reexamination of the problem within ten years will pose the question, "In view of the duplication why do we have the Ground Forces?" Thence if the Ground Forces are turned over to the Air Forces, we return to a two department pattern but I contend that this is the hard way to do it.

"P.S. There are many examples of incomplete understanding on the part of the A.A.F. with respect to naval air power as reflected by public statements of Generals, a few:

'The Navy needs carrier aircraft for the defense of the Fleet.'

"As a matter of fact these planes are the Navy's big offensive power -- these planes, their flying "fields" and logistic support all move together and they can strike some areas long before land based bombers can get there.

'The time has come to admit that the Army and Navy are only service forces for the A.A.F.'

"However, Navy fighters from carriers cleared the air over Japan for A.A.F. bombers -- no other type of fighters could be brought to bear.

'We will let the Navy keep its carrier aircraft for the time being.'

"A clear forecast that the A.A.F intends to go after naval air power."

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"Referring to your letter of 16 May 1947, I heartily endorse your Bill HR-3469 as being the plan best suited to giving the country the best National Security of any proposal, as regards to the armed services, that I have yet seen.

"To my mind, your bill does two outstanding things:

1. It prevents a Super-secretary from having too much power.
2. It safeguards the interests of the Navy, Naval Aviation, and the Marine Corps by maintaining a two-department system.

"I believe that a Coordinator is all that is needed at the higher levels. To have an all-powerful Secretary would offer an opportunity for a strong man to become a dictator.

"I believe that your bill gives the present Army Air Forces all the independence they need. It permits them to fight a war in any fashion they choose, and yet leaves them under the Secretary of War who can order them to support the ground forces when the ground forces need air support.

I have heard a good many arguments pro and con about the Vice President being the Coordinator of National Defense. I strongly favor this because he is an officer endorsed by the electorate. It has been said that his duties as President of the Senate might interfere, but the fact that we have not had a Vice President for two years would lead me to the opinion that if we had one, he could spare enough time to coordinate the armed services.

"I believe membership of your National Defense Council might well be reduced. The more people who are in on high level planning, the more difficult it becomes to maintain necessary secrecy of planned operations.

"I heartily agree that the Marine Corps should be included in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I prefer that the Coordinator of the National Defense be a member as listed in your bill.

"All the objections I have to your bill I consider of a minor nature.

"If we are to have a Navy, it should be a fighting Navy. I recognize the predominant role of air power - which includes guided missiles - in a future war. I do not see how the Navy can expect to maintain a Naval Air Force to fight with, if a separate Air Department is established.

"Most of the naval officers with whom I have talked are heartily in favor of maintaining a two-department system, and those who have studied your bill are favorably disposed to it in the main."

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"There can be no question that modern war between great Powers, such as the United States now is, requires the closest co-ordination between all branches of the Armed Forces and a close co-ordination of the military effort with the civilian effort on which the military effort is based. I believe all of the proposals for legislation have these ends in view.

"Insofar as the Navy is concerned, I am certain that a Navy without efficient naval aviation is of little value in modern war and that our Marine Corps is an asset of tremendous value to both the Navy and the country. In any law to co-ordinate the Armed Forces, I think there should be included a sufficient description of the functions of each Service to ensure the future status of naval aviation and of the Marine Corps. From what I have read recently in the daily press, this appears to be in process of accomplishment by amendment to the bill. Such a description of the functions of each Service should be broad enough to prevent any attempts to whittle away or practically to take over the functions of any one Service by the others, and at the same time not be so restrictive in its terms as to prevent necessary adjustments between the Services being made from time to time. I think a Declaration of Policy, such as is contained in your H. R. 3469 and in Senator Robertson's S. 1282, is a valuable addition to any legislation on this subject.

"Whether or not the Army Air Corps should be continued under the War Department as the United States Air Force as in your bill, or be established as a separate Department of the Air Force as in H. R. 2319 and S. 1282, is a question on which my personal opinion favors your stand. I believe that both sea fighting and land fighting require the closest integration with their respective air efforts. If in the coming reorganization the Navy Department continues to have its naval and marine aviation components, while the Department of the Army has to depend on the

Department of the Air Force for its aviation, as in H.R. 2319 there is no consistent principle followed in this matter. If, on the other hand, the Department of the Army is to have its own aviation as in S. 1282, then we set up strategic bombing as the principal offensive function of the new Department of the Air Force; and we would have the aviation used in major land fighting placed under two separate Departments.

"The position of the present Army Air Corps in the future military establishment is, however, something which is of primary concern to the Army, provided that the efficiency of naval aviation and of the Navy is in no way impaired by what is done in this respect. While I, personally, believe that we would have a sounder organization with the present two Departments and with Army aviation closely integrated with the War Department, I am inclined to think that the setting up of a separate Department of the Air Force has such backing both in the Congress and throughout the country that it will be accepted. Any organization will work if we get it staffed by able men who will pull together.

"Whether we have a Co-ordinator of National Defense as in H.R. 3469 and S. 1282, or a Secretary of National Defense as in H. R. 2319, is a subject on which I have no very decided opinion. There is an important job to be done in co-ordinating -- for the President as Commander-in-Chief -- the Army and Navy, provided the President wishes to delegate this authority. So long as the new position remains one of co-ordination and of laying down policy and does not grow into one of administration of the separate Departments, I believe the new official will serve a very useful function in our Federal government. He must, of course, be given sufficient assistance to enable him to act effectively, but not enough so that another big bureaucracy will come into being."

"I am in full accord with your statement that closer coordination of Army, Navy and Air Forces should be affected. As you point out, the pattern of the steps taken in this direction is the important factor. However, I am in firm opposition to certain proposals on these matters which are being entertained in the Congress today.

"It is my view, Mr. Cole, that an important factor in bringing the so-called Merger to the forefront of public discussion was the highly valuable support given by the Army Air Forces. The reason for this is not difficult to understand since the Air Forces would revert to their original status, under the Army Chief of Staff, unless some remedial legislation were enacted. The Air Forces wanted a completely autonomous position: their interest in closer coordination with the Army Ground Forces or the Navy is today what it has been for many years past, very limited indeed.

"For reasons set forth hereafter, I believe that the Army Air Forces should be developed into a closely integrated part of the United States Army in very much the same relation that Naval Aviation bears to the forces afloat.

"The first point I would present is that of cost, since it is evident that for some years to come the Congress may be expected to be decidedly economy-minded so far as concerns the Armed Services. The establishment of a third service must obviously entail greatly increased costs, which at no time in the future can possibly show economy over the two-service system for a national defense establishment of equal strength. Statements of expected economies in future years, presented by various witnesses, apply to coordinated efforts which are applicable to either the two or the three Armed Forces arrangements, though less readily affected under the latter. Basically

therefore, it is apparent that the taxpayer will get less for his defense dollar with the formation of a third Armed Service.

"So far as integration of Air with Army Ground Forces is concerned, I cannot conceive of any effective Combat Ground Forces in this day and age operating without an appropriate Air component. The usual explanation is that the separate Air Force will furnish this support. Lacking interest, lacking common understanding, lacking integrated planning and direction, I cannot believe that the separate Air Force can or will give intelligent and adequate support. In this connection I invite your attention to the Air Arm of the Royal Navy, which was provided by the Royal Air Force between World War I and II. The efficiency and effectiveness of that service was of such low order, when its state compelled return to the Navy in 1939, that it was late in the war before reaching an acceptable standard, largely with American equipment. I feel sure that air support given our own Army by a separate Air Force can be properly compared with that given the Royal Navy by the Royal Air Force.

"It seems evident to me that a modern Army having continuous and major requirements for air transport and supply, as well as direct support when in combat, will soon demand that these components be directly attached to the Ground Command. In such case it would seem impossible to avoid direct duplication of large numbers of aircraft at greatly added cost, or alternatively, reduction in strength of the other services.

"There has been much ballyhoo the last year or two about strategic bombing, with the suggestion that ultra long-range super aircraft will soon be able to attack any spot on the earth from bases in the homeland. The fact is, however, that senior Air Force Commanders are agreed that strategic bombing in the pattern of the last war is finished. The common availability to all nations of the proximity fuze is the major cause of this, and the condition will become more unfavorable with the early introduction of ground-to-air target-seeking rocket missiles.

"In this day of the atomic bomb it would appear that the major air offensive power of the United States should consist of a modest number of maximum performance aircraft especially adaptable to "A" bomb delivery, together with the fighters required to escort such bombers; both types necessarily of moderate range. The bulk of our Air Forces, however, should be closely integrated with the Naval and Ground elements, and largely devoted to their support in capturing and holding forward bases close to the enemies' borders. This means amphibious operations much in the pattern with which we closed the last war. And from all present indications we will fight alone, in the manner of the Pacific War, rather than from bases held for us by Allied, as was the case in Europe."

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"Since the discussion of the merger of the Armed Forces was initiated, there have been new developments which, in my opinion, further strengthen our position that we must not rush in precipitately to change the basic organization of our security forces. The development of guided missiles, planes and projectiles with supersonic speeds, explosives of great power, bacteriological and virus warfare, probable development of radioactive materials which can be dispersed by guided missiles, etc. -- all point to the desirability of building on what we have rather than tearing down any part of our existing organization. In other words, my thought is that, for the time being at least, and until we have a much more clear picture of the function that will be played by aviation, as we knew it in the recent war, we should not place all of our eggs in the "aviation basket," but should reserve decision until we expand our knowledge.

"After careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that we should stand on our original position - that a completely integrated naval force, with supporting service functions, including an adequate Air-arm, is essential for the National Security. The character and scope of the Naval Air-arm should be determined by strategists and tacticians, not by legislators, nor as a result of a "deal" between the Army and Navy."

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"Despite the assurances given in the letters enclosed from Mr. Forrestal, you will probably find that very few, if any, active officers in the Navy will wish to have their views held other than confidential. The officers who have testified before Congress, mentioned in the Secretary's letter of 10 May, are, with the possible exception of General Edson, not in a position to suffer by any displeasure which might be incurred through such remarks. None of them have any future to worry about.

"Personally, I have been strongly against the so-called merger of the Armed Services right from the start. I remember when a Board, headed by Admiral Richardson, came through the Pacific early in 1945 and questioned all senior officers available. The situation confronted us unexpectedly, and I had little time to give it thought, but spoke against it then. Basically, it is my opinion that no one person can take over such a tremendous job as is envisioned in H.R. 2319 and be anything other than a hindrance or a figurehead. To couple with this the control of about half of our national budget would strike a severe blow at our democratic form of government. This Secretary would in effect, combine four Cabinet positions in himself. The Secretaries of the Armed Services would be ciphers. I have felt all along that Congress would never permit such a set-up to be made into law. Despite all of the forebodings of my service and civilian friends, I have had a sense of security in the good judgment of the House and the Senate in this matter and have not worried too much about it.

"Now, if we do not make a Secretary of the National Defense as envisioned in H. R. 2319, there is no urgent need to do much of anything in a big way, except perhaps to set up the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a little more secure basis than at present. The President can always fortify and implement the Joint Chiefs of Staff himself, and he has done so up to the present time. This may be sufficient. However, there is the danger that the civilian Secretaries might get into the Joint Chiefs of Staff picture in wartime and cramp their style. Right now anything that comes out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is accepted as gospel by everyone and obeyed without question. Getting back to the Secretary of National Defense, Section 103 is very dangerous if you do not wish a big military staff set-up. What would you have but a military staff where the Secretary of National Defense has four Special Assistants and the power to detail as many Army, Navy, and Air Force officers to duty in his office as he desires? In order for such a Secretary to really function he must have a big staff and will, in my opinion, absolutely dominate all other military activities. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Section 111, are under his control, and would merely form a part of his Staff.

"In regard to unity of command, which is really what this is all about on a rather high level, I have had four years of experience with it during the recent war. There is nothing new about unity of command, and it has always been provided, and known by the Army and Navy that the President may order it whenever and wherever he sees fit, and this has been done at various times, extending clear back to the Mexican War. It has been my experience that whenever the President or the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered unity of command in a certain

theater or for a certain campaign or operation, it worked excellently when clearly stated and backed up. Regular officers in the Army and Navy know how to obey orders and they do so without quibbling.

"In regard to your own Bill, H. R. 3469, it has many excellent points. Concerning your Co-ordinator for National Defense, he is really a Chief of Staff to the President, and you have him properly lined up under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the National Defense Council. I would expect you not to limit his selection to that of a civilian. It would seem the man himself is the thing wanted, regardless of his previous status.

"I am also with you in thinking that the Army Air Forces should remain under the War Department, though it is hard for me to visualize the Secretary of War having practically two separate departments under him. He practically has this now, and, as you know, there is considerable jealousy and bad feeling. Perhaps in separating them by law we will achieve more harmony and better results. I have always felt that this Army and Air Corps trouble could, at any time, be straightened out by the President."

"As Vice Chief of Naval Operations, I have maintained close touch with all aspects of the unification issued. I am in full accord with the views on this question expressed by the Chief of Naval Operations before committees of Congress. While I personally support H. R. 2319, which reflects the agreements reached by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, I have been conscious of uncertainty in the minds of certain officers regarding the adequate protection of the interests of the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation under the original language of the bill.

"This legislation is of such far-reaching importance that no effort should be spared to devise language that will impart confidence and a sense of security to those whose interests are directly affected. If the proposed new National Defense organization is to be a success, it must have the endorsement and whole-hearted support of all implementing agencies and branches. For the above reason, I favor amendments relating to the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation recently made by the Senate Armed Services Committee which, I believe, will accomplish the purpose desired."

"Subject to the above qualifying remarks, I like your bill better than I do H. R. 2319. My principal reason for this is that your bill makes fewer changes in the existing two department setup, which after all, has just carried us through to victory in the greatest war in history. Perhaps this is a somewhat smug point of view, but I believe that you should not break up a winning team while it is still winning. I do not believe in burning down the barn to get rid of rats."

"I consider that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General A. A. Vandegrift, has very ably presented my objections to the legislation in question. Any comments which I might make about it would be, therefore, merely a repetition of facts which are already available to you.

"Naturally, H.R. 3469 appeals to me because of my firm conviction that the two services, Army and Navy with their respective air and Marine components, are necessary and sufficient. On the other hand, the National Defense Council, as described in H.R. 3469, appears to be unnecessarily inclusive and unwieldy and I would prefer that it be constituted as is the National Security Council in H.R. 2319."

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"I believe that the organization structure as set forth in H.R. 3469 more nearly meets the objections that have been raised against S.758 and H.R. 2319. It provides a more effective integration of ALL departments and agencies of the government concerned with the national defense, and closer collaboration between the fighting services.

"The creation of this third Department under S.758 and H.R. 2319 is absolutely contrary to any step leading to closer coordination between the armed services and is believed to be a fatal defect in these bills. Once all connections with the Army are severed, it is logical to believe that the Air Force will attain a status like that of the Royal Air Force, with similar uniforms and ranks. In this connection, it is not understood as to why the Air Force requires more autonomy than it is now accorded in order to exercise its functions.

"The Air Force has conducted an extremely effective publicity campaign through the newspapers with the result that the public has been led to believe that the present compromise bills are strongly desired by all services and any delay in their enactment into law can only show a callous disregard for the future security of this country. Those of us who have lived with the "merger" legislation during the past 1½ years know that nothing is farther from the truth.

"I strongly believe that no Department of National Defense should in essence be built around any specific weapon. If we should proceed contrary to this principle, we should be equally justified in a Department of Submarines, Field Artillery, Guided Missiles, etc. While the airplane is unquestionably one of our most dominant weapons today, there is no reason to believe that it will not be replaced with a more effective weapon in the near future.

"Such controversial items as the creation of the office of a Super or over-all Secretary or a Coordinator of National Defense and the powers to be vested in such individuals should be the subject of separate legislation in order that the pros and cons of each major change may be thoroughly and deliberately explored before their enactment into law."

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"In the final analysis the success of any plan for coordination of the military establishment will depend on the whole-hearted acceptance of the plan by the personnel concerned, on the spirit of mutual trust, confidence and sincere cooperation exhibited in its implementation, and on the preservation of the morale and integrity of the component forces. I feel sure that this favorable result can be attained within the framework of H. R. 2319."

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"I am an officer of long and rather varied Naval experience. My specialty is aviation and my experience in that specialty is extensive. During the recent war I served in the Navy Department and overseas. I had ample opportunity both to observe and participate in the planning behind the war effort, particularly as related to Joint Plans and Operations. Summarizing, I have had an opportunity to observe the workings of the Armed Services under pre-war conditions, war conditions under the changes made under War Powers Acts, and I am familiar with most of proposals for post-war reorganization.

"I am firmly of the opinion that the current statutory organization of Armed Services must be changed, but I am most seriously concerned over the manner in which the present move for change has developed, and the results therefrom. The manner has been loud outcries from officers of the Army, particularly the Army Air Forces, against the conduct of war and demands for an immediate reorganization along certain definite lines, all without impartial examination of the criticisms or careful unbiased examination of the proposed changes. For example, so far as I can ascertain, the demand by most of the officers in responsible positions in the Army Air Forces for a separate co-equal Department of the Air has been accepted, almost blindly, by the majority of the public, the press, and I believe the Congress as a fundamental requisite to any reorganization, without any real unbiased examination of the subject. The validity of the demand cannot be supported by war experience, if anything that experience supports the contrary view. Actually this demand stems back many years. It is generally admitted that naval aviation belongs as it now is integrated with the Navy as a whole. I see no reason why this thought does not apply equally well with regard to Army Air and the Army, except the Army Air Force Officers do not want it that way. Their leaders decided that back in the early 20's. There has developed progressively an estrangement between the Army ground forces and air forces as a result of this attitude. I know for a fact that this is the reason the proposal for a Separate Air Department has considerable Army ground force support. The ground force is fed up with the family argument. They know that separation is not sound, but regard it as the lesser of two evils.

"My assumption is that the primary purpose of all of the bills under consideration is to improve the efficiency of the military services in order to enhance the security of our country. The closest possible coordination is essential to efficiency. Three Departments will be four times as difficult to coordinate as two. (Call the departments "a", "b" and "c". With two you only have to coordinate "a" with "b". With three it becomes "a" with "b", "a" with "c", "b" with "c", and "a", "b" and "c" together). It is my firm belief that a separate Department of the Air is unnecessary, will not strengthen the National Defense, will add materially to the National financial burden and will make coordination much more difficult. I concur with the proposal in Section 301 of your bill.

"In considering H.R. 2319 it should be recognized that it is a compromise bill. It was drafted after a long series of arguments and in many cases without any real reconciliation of ideas. It appears to me but natural that the language which would be acceptable on points in dispute would be language subject to different interpretations by those who were parties to the drafting of the bill. This is borne out by a great deal of the testimony presented before the Congressional Committees. I had no part in the drafting of the bill. To me the language is clear and unmistakable. Referring to Section 102 (a), it appears entirely clear to me that the language gives to the Secretary of the National Defense complete authority and control over the Departments of the National Defense establishments, subject

only to such curbs as the President may apply by Executive Order or otherwise, which curbs of course may be modified at any time. The language of this section appears to me potentially to destroy the integrity of the Departments and to reduce their respective Secretaries to the level of Administrative Assistants. I regard that as dangerous and wholly unsatisfactory. It is my understanding that this Section is being re-drafted in Senate Armed Services Committee but I have no first-hand knowledge of the revised language.

"It is my opinion that the Secretaries of the Departments of the National Defense Establishments should retain their "Cabinet level". I consider it in the National interests that the President and the other members of his cabinet get first-hand information regarding those Departments and also have available the advice and counsel of those Secretaries on any other matters directly or indirectly affecting those Departments. There is no language in H. R. 2319 dealing specifically with this subject but there have been statements, presumably authoritative, that the Secretaries of the Departments will not be members of Cabinet.

"I favor the establishment as provided in H.R. 2319 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Munitions Board Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency and Resources Board.

"H. R. 3469 (your bill) provides a "Coordinator of National Defense" and with certain rather minor exceptions leaves it to the President to determine his duties. It appears to be the intent of H.R. 3469 to reduce the importance and authority of the Coordinator well below that of the Secretary of National Defense provided in H. R. 2319. If such is the case, I agree with the idea of reducing the authority in order better to safeguard the integrity of the Navy Department, but it appears that under H. R. 3469 the President could delegate to the Coordinator any or all of the authority he holds under the Constitution and Statutes.

"Section 102 establishes a National Defense Council with a very widely spread membership. I question the need for, and usefulness of, such a Council and specifically I question the appropriateness of Members of Congress being included. The National Defense Council appears to be in place of the War Council and the National Security Council provided for in H.R. 2319. As stated in paragraph 7 above, I favor the provision of the boards, councils, etc., set up in H.R. 2319 and much prefer them to the provisions of H. R. 3469.

"I am heartily in favor of Section 301 of H.R. 3469 which creates the Army Air Forces as part of the Military Establishment of the United States within the Department of War. This subject was discussed in detail in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.

"The postscript of your letter inquired as to my views regarding service opinion on the question of reorganization. I believe I am safe in saying that a majority of the responsible officers would heartily endorse any measures which would bring about a better coordination between the Army Services, but want to be assured in advance that such measures would accomplish that purpose without jeopardizing the integrity of the Navy including its Aviation and the Marine Corps. They have grave doubts as to whether H.R. 2319 has sincerity of purpose behind it or whether it is intended as a first step in gaining a control over the Navy towards the end of depriving it of its Aviation and the Marine Corps and eventually reducing it to a point where it could play but a minor role in the National Defense. Their concern in this matter appears to me to be justified by past and continuing statements of officers in responsible positions in the Army and particularly in the Army Air Forces. They are extremely bitter over the methods employed by those

officers to drive through their plans. I believe naval officers in general are fearful both of the future defense of the country and of the provisions of H. R. 2319 in its present form becoming law. I am reliably informed that a considerable percentage of naval aviators have reached the conclusion that if a separate Department of Air is created, naval aviation is doomed, and have convinced themselves that their individual interests best would be served by transferring to the Army Air Forces and that the best interests of the country would be also served by such transfer, supporting this conclusion with the argument that if the country's military aviation is to come wholly into the hands of the Army Air Forces it is essential that that organization have within it as soon as possible a sizeable element that understands the application of air power to naval warfare. The very serious effect of the loss of this experienced personnel from Naval Aviation is obvious."

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"You may gather from the foregoing that I do not concur in either H.R. 2319 or H.R. 3469 as presently drafted. Of the two I prefer H.R. 3469 although there are many changes necessary to make it suitable from the standpoint of the country, the Army and the Navy."

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"In view of the controversy that has been going on between the Army and Navy over the subject of the consolidation of the two services and the bitter feelings that have been aroused, it is my firm belief that no legislation to that end should be enacted at the present time."

"Consolidation or rather co-ordination, is a matter of education, a long step in this direction has been made through the establishment of joint schools, such as the National War College at Washington and the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk. Officers from other services attend the special Army and Navy schools. It will be a matter of several years before the officers who have passed through these schools arrive at positions of high authority."

"It will take time to dispel the ill feeling that has arisen between the two services. This has been due in part to two causes:

"(a) The efforts of the Army Air Force to hamper and restrict the expansion of Naval Aviation since the days of General Mitchell. Naval Aviation has always been an integral part of the Navy. Aircraft carriers are now the "backbone of the fleet" but they are still Navy."

"The Army Air Force has been working for its independence since the First World War. That has been their primary mission. At times their loyalty to the Army has been dubious."

"(b) The Army's dislike of the U.S. Marine Corps and its increased power to reduce Marine Corps strength and efficiency under a Unified Department."

"In case some legislation is considered necessary at the present time, I prefer H.R. 3469 to H.R. 2319. It produces the least disruption of the present organization. It provides a National Defense Council on which the appropriate Committees of Congress are represented by their Chairmen, a most essential provision."

"It leaves the Army Air Force as a part of the Army, where it belongs."

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Referring to H. R. 2319, my principal objection is to the separate "Air Force" proposed in that bill. The very name is a misnomer, for approximately one-third of the air forces of the United States are now and will remain in the Navy. But the important points are: first, that the difficulty of coordinating three armed services and their parent departments will not just be fifty percent greater than two, but three times as great, for three main links of cooperation or coordination must be forged instead of one; second, that the additional expense of the new independent Department of the Air Force will offset many of the alleged economies which the proponents claim for it. I am confident that the Air Force would insist upon its own supporting corps and services, duplicating some of those in the Army, such as the Ordnance Corps and the Signal Corps, for instance.

"While cooperation, or the lack of it, between Army Ground and Army (or independent) air forces is principally their concern, and not the Navy's, I cannot refrain from remarking that there seem to be two major activities of growing importance in modern warfare which involve both these types of forces, and which, it seems to me, will be accomplished more efficiently by their remaining in one service than by separating. These functions are: (a), the antiaircraft defense, by a combination of air and ground weapons, of both fixed and mobile ground positions, and (b), the air-ground operation of airborne troops. I think these important activities dictate an even closer bond between our air and ground forces, rather than a separation of one from the other. The same thing is true of tactical air support of ground force combat operations. In fact, it seems to me that the only possible excuse for a separate air force is strategic air power. Numerous aviators believe strategic bombing by manned airplanes is obsolescent. General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces in World War II, has expressed this thought by saying that the recent war was the "last war of the pilots". If that is so, and strategic bombing is to be succeeded by guided missile bombardment, surely no new and separate armed service is necessary, since the latter type of arm will be essentially nothing more than a glorified form of artillery.

"I view the creation of a complete new secretaryship of National Defense, as proposed in H. R. 2319, with considerable apprehension. In the first place, the position will surely lessen the prestige of the present Secretaries of War and the Navy, and may render difficult the procurement of men of stature to occupy those posts. Then there will be a constant tendency to overdo the consolidation job, to search out dissimilarities and duplications in materiel or procedures in the various armed services, and arbitrarily eliminate them, when in some cases, for best efficiency, they should not be eliminated, lest each service emerge with some weapon or procedure which is a reasonably good compromise, but not quite good enough for maximum efficiency for any one service. And in war, "almost-good-enough" weapons or tactics usually have the same value as second-best poker hand.

"There is also the danger of losing time in having to refer too many matters to the super-secretary for decision. Even such matters as are really of joint concern should often be left to direct negotiation between the two organizations for settlement; Army and Navy Ordnance settled many such problems between them smoothly and expeditiously in World War II. But that method probably would not satisfy some of the strong-minded officers who would inevitably be drawn to the super-secretary as his assistants. Too often, they might feel the necessity of persuading the Secretary of National Defense to exert his powers of coordination to effect some economy of material or manpower, and thus incur delay, whereas the third element of war strength, time, might be the most important. In other words, proper decentralization of effort and authority becomes more difficult if the top management becomes too ponderous.

As regards economies to be effected by the creation of the new secretaryship, undoubtedly some would eventually be achieved. Whether they would offset the additional expense of the separate Department of the Air Force, and the new superimposed administrative echelon, only time would tell. In peace, with the volume of purchasing greatly reduced, I have serious doubts as to any net gain.

"Your alternative bill, H. R. 3469, seems to correct most of the defects in H. R. 2319 which I have noted above. I like the "Coordinator of National Defense" better than the "Secretary of National Defense", as it describes better the only functions which I believe this administrative echelon should perform.

"Summing up, I believe the Army Air Forces have, in the recent war, demonstrated their great value to the national security, and have earned the right to complete parity with the Army Ground Forces, instead of remaining a mere supporting corps. But I see no need for a completely separate air service. I fully believe it will be more expensive, and no more efficient, than the present (not the prewar) organization. Also, I would prefer a Coordinator of National Defense, with limited authority, to a new super-secretary with complete supervision over the armed services departments."

"This is in reply to your letter of May the sixteenth in which you asked my comment on H.R. 3469. Before making that comment I must state that ever since I first heard of the so-called "merger" of the armed services, I have been alarmed at the possible impacts of a merger on effective national security. I can visualize no effective national nor international security that will be effective without a highly mobile, closely integrated Navy fabricated to exercise air-sea power against any enemy. I become apprehensive, therefore, when under a merger the Navy appears to be considered entirely of ships, and air power seems to be defined as all-inclusive of every means of bringing Aviation to bear against the enemy. A modern Navy must be largely an Air Navy and it must have every facility it requires to support that Air Navy and to use it for its designed purpose; that is, initially as a spearhead (and a sustained spearhead at that) against the enemy; and later as the on-the-spot mobile pounding force which enables amphibious forces to do their jobs.

"To repeat, my unease about the merger was occasioned by my belief that under a merger Naval Aviation would disappear and with it the Navy would disappear.

"The past war, however, demonstrated very clearly that there must be closer coordination of the various armed services to obtain the greatest impact in the shortest time against an enemy. There must be closer planning for war including, not only strategic plans, but also logistic plans; there must be closer coordination of training and training methods, but that coordination should not be exercised to the point where individual armed services become weakened to the point of impotence.

"I have been apprehensive over the formation of a third executive department to be known as the Department of the Air Force because throughout the years of my service in Naval Aviation the proponents of "Single Air Force" have sharp-shot at Naval aviation, belittling it and stating as early as 1925 that the carrier was obsolescent. And even now there is too much talk of restricting the functions of Naval Aviation's shore based aircraft to patrol the seelanes, to anti-submarine warfare and to the protection of shipping. The Navy should have the bombers to hit, at once, the menaces to the sea lanes that the searchers and patrollers

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find. In World War II the Navy patrol-bombers did just that and there was no question, that I know of, as to their right and duty to attack.

"Certainly no one with my long association with aviation can be other than an enthusiast for air power but, on the other hand, my experience convinces me that ground forces and Naval surface forces and aviation are mutually dependent upon each other to the extent that no armed service should be deprived of that air power which is required to impose its will on the enemy.

"I like the declaration policy in H. R. 3469. It seems to assure to the elements of the military structure the balanced forces necessary for the exercise of their responsibilities. Furthermore, the declaration policy provides for a sufficiently autonomous strategic air force to permit the proper development of that air force without having it engulf everything that flies to the detriment of other armed forces.

"If the concept of future warfare envisages air borne armies largely supported by air, it seems entirely proper that the proper integration and cooperation between the Army and the Air Force will be assured by placing both of them under the Secretary of War without strangulating effect on either one. However, I cannot see that a single promotion list for the Air Force will have any healthful unifying effect within the War Department.

"Regarding the Coordinator of National Defense, I like the description of his duties with the restrictions imposed on his activities.

"The National Defense Council appears to be large and may be unwieldy when quick decisions must be made. I like the idea of bringing representatives of the Congress into the Council, but it might be advisable to reduce the total membership of the Council to provide for a smaller organization.

"Summarizing: H. R. 3469, for the present, seems to spell out the functions of the Armed Services in more dependable form than does H. R. 2319."

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"Regarding H. R. 2319, I am in agreement with Secretary Forrestal and Admiral Nimitz, providing that this bill is not a foot in the door for future emasculation of Naval aviation or the Marine Corps for the Navy or for tanks for the Army or for strategic air forces for the Air component."

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"I shall try to be brief. I feel that I am expressing the thought of many officers, in that many of us fear that the Navy and the Marine Corps may lose that complete autonomy in the conduct of its own affairs which we feel necessary in the best interests of national defense. We feel that any unification bill which may allow one man control of the destinies of the armed forces may be to the detriment of the Navy in the inner councils where two or more opinions or votes (one for the Army and one for the Air Force) might obtain against one for the Navy.

"We of the Navy hold the tradition that our service is the strongest instrument by which our nation's policies may be upheld throughout the world. We are trained and are accustomed to sail to the farthest reaches of the earth and stay there in support of these policies. We view with apprehension the tendency on the part of some of our people to believe the doctrines currently advanced by the Air Forces that they may take over this traditional role of the Navy

and fly to the uttermost reaches of the earth to enforce our policies with a show of force. We know this premise is unsound -- just as unsound as many of the other radical ideas propounded in our public prints by the rabid advocates of air power, who would carry on all wars from the air alone. We are not unmindful of the fact that a majority of our citizens were ready to believe the pronouncements of deSeversky in 1942, and though these pronouncements have now been thoroughly discredited, that many of the generals of our Army Air Corps are making similar statements for public consumption today -- with just as little factual sense -- but with the obvious objective of influencing public opinion in favor of unification of the armed services.

"Of late in the testimony of Admiral King, General Vandegrift, General Merritt Edson and others there can be no doubt that in the opinion of many the provisions of this bill might possibly allow the Army and the Air Corps together to overslaugh the Navy to the detriment of the best interest of our national armed strength. Personally, I feel the same way about it.

"Science is undoubtedly pointing the way toward "push button" developments. If unification of the services is to lead us to a position whereby the Army Air Corps is to push all the buttons -- as stated publicly by some of the Air Corps' more extreme spokesmen -- we shall be led to a position detrimental to our national security. Unification legislation must definitely ensure that there be no such single control."

"The question arises as to whether the Army and the Navy should be tied together at the top administrative level of the armed forces through the medium of a single Secretary of Armed Forces or whether, below the President and the Supreme civil coordinating agencies mentioned above, the Army and the Navy should each have its top civilian administrative official, with inter-agency bodies to insure cooperative functioning.

"Based on an experience of 16 years in Washington, during which I have had many contacts with the various Departments of the Executive and Legislative Branches of our Government, I am firm in my opinion that if we are to have the best Army and the best Navy within the limitations of our financial resources, they must be kept separate administratively.

"This conclusion is founded on my conviction that with one Secretary of the Armed Forces, whether he be, in fact, the administrative head of those forces or whether he be somewhat of a figurehead, as proposed by the so-called Collins War Department Plan, he will inevitably be dominated by one or the other branch of the Armed Forces and, depending upon the limitations of his authority, that branch will be more or less favored at the expense of the other. The two (or three) branches (three if we have a completely separate Strategic Air Force) will be in a continuous struggle for the favor of the Secretary. I hope that this does not sound too derogatory with respect to the independence of thought of the prospective Secretary of the Armed Forces. I know, from experience, that it will work out that way.

"The principle reason for my conclusion, however, is that, with separate civilian Secretaries having administrative control of the separate branches of the Armed Forces, each Secretary reporting to separate Committees of Congress and making his needs known to those Committees each service will have greater opportunities to make known its requirements and thus to overcome to some extent, at least, the proverbial opposition to the development of the Armed Forces in time of peace. In other words, we will come closer to obtaining the essential support for each branch of the armed forces, if they plead their cases to Congress separately.

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"While the Army and Navy are basically military organizations, they are also huge business enterprises. In time of war they must be organized for rapid and efficient expansion to their war magnitudes. One of the chief advantages claimed by the advocates of merger has to do with the conduct of the Army and Navy as business enterprises and particularly with the procurement of goods and services.

"In this area, it is claimed that the proposed merger would result in lowered costs and greater efficiency by reason of elimination of duplication and reduction of overhead Staffs in such matters as :

- (a) Production, procurement and inspection.
- (b) Storage, packaging and issue.
- (c) Transportation and distribution.
- (d) Construction of facilities.
- (e) Mobilization and training.
- (f) Housing of troops and workers.
- (g) Medical facilities.
- (h) Disbursing, accounting and auditing.
- (i) Communications.
- (j) Internal Security.
- (k) Real estate acquisitions and disposals.
- (l) Research and development.
- (m) Administration and management.

"In an effort to avoid pure speculation, I have studied the experiences of several of our large industrial organizations, where the claimed advantages would accrue if the reasoning of the advocates of merger is correct.

"The two greatest business organizations in America, greater in magnitude of operations in time of peace than the Army and the Navy are the U. S. Steel Corporation and the General Motors Corporation. For the years between wars, the Corporations spent more money and did more purchasing than the Army and Navy. Therefore, since the corporations occupy an intermediate position between Army-Navy peace time and wartime activities, it is reasonable to assume that procurement policies of these highly successful business enterprises will give us something of a guide for proper Army-Navy procurement organization.

"It may surprise you to learn that neither U. S. Steel nor General Motors operate consolidated procurement services. U. S. Steel is made up of 34 companies each of which purchases its own requirements in competition with the others as well as with outside purchasers. Each subsidiary company operates almost entirely independently, its president having practically a free hand. If he fails to make a profit, some one else gets his job; but the parent corporation gives him no ready-made alibis for failure by imposing restrictions on his freedom of thought and action.

"Consolidation in the case of these great industrial organizations brings very definite gains in such top policy matters as labor relations, financial resources, selling practices, and business contacts. But great care is taken to leave with the responsible officers of each subsidiary complete freedom to exercise their ingenuity and individual talents.

"Private enterprise has learned through hard experience, that mere size does not in itself promote efficiency and that the absence of competition within a large organization may be the cause rather than the preventative of waste.

"The Army and the Navy is each individually too large for efficient consolidation in procurement. For this reason both Departments have largely decentralized their procurement functions to the component organizations within their own structures. In the Navy, procurement has actually been dis-

persed so that the various Materiel Bureaus are now to a considerable degree their own procurement agencies for their own specialized technical equipment. Adequate coordination is provided by the Material Division of the Assistant Secretary's Office.

"This decentralization of procurement has contributed notably to the speed and effectiveness with which the fleets and their supporting activities have been served. It has concentrated the responsibility for achieving an end objective in a particular Bureau and it has given that Bureau all of the authority necessary to accomplish its mission. If a Bureau were dependent upon someone else for the performance of one or more of its vital functions, it would be helpless in the case of failures of the other party to make delivery.

"We must recognize that efficient procurement in itself does not necessarily mean efficient end performance. We may have an aggregation of very efficient components without an efficient and objective. To illustrate: we tried out in the Navy Department at one time a system of centralized stenographic services. An executive who wanted a stenographer would touch a button and a stenographer would arrive from the central pool. It was not long before we learned that while we were saving money on stenographic services, we were wasting the time of our top level administrative and executive personnel because of the unfamiliarity of the stenographers with the specialized requirements of those they were serving.

"It is claimed that merger will eliminate competition. While that is true, in a sense, I cannot concede that this is necessarily an unmixed blessing. Competition is the very foundation stone of American enterprise. Monopolies tend to become stagnant, unresponsive, and stultified. On the other hand, competition within healthy limits leads to greater alertness, progressiveness, and efficiency; and frequently contributes to new developments, technical advances, and greater over-all effectiveness.

"Competition between the services resulted in the development of the dive-bomber by the Navy. It has been claimed at various times during this war that the Marines were in competition with the Army and the Seabees in competition with the Army Engineers. Our war experiences has proved conclusively that both Marines and Seabees have their specialized functions to perform and both have amply justified their existence.

"Competition is the life blood of progress. To deliberately stifle it by consolidation would be a wanton waste of one of our greatest American assets. Domination of the thinking of either service by officers who do not have the "feel" of that service would have ruinous effect.

"Much point has been made of the so-called "duplication" of facilities between Army and Navy. Before entering upon a discussion of this matter, we should define just what we mean by "duplication." What we are really seeking to avoid is waste resulting from the construction of excess or surplus facilities.

"Whether this excess or surplus results from the unnecessary duplication by one service of facilities built by the other or is the result of excessive building within a service is not significant, since all of the money comes out of Uncle Sam's pocket. If one of the services builds two hospitals when only one is needed, the sin is just as grievous as if each service built a hospital when one hospital would have been sufficient for both.

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"Examine the record, we will find instances of excess building within a service which appears superficially to be more flagrantly wasteful than the so-called "duplication" of facilities.

"There has been, I believe, a disposition to speak of "duplication" of facilities in such manner as to give the impression that there was a vast amount of excess construction by both Army and Navy. While excess or surplus construction by either service may be indicative of poor planning by that service, consolidation of construction under one service would certainly not have prevented such poor planning; on the contrary, the poor planning if it existed would have been aggravated because of the increase in the work load.

"In summary, I believe:

"(a) That the proposal for amalgamation of Army and Navy procurement and other service functions is based on a fallacious concept which emphasizes the efficiency of the means rather than the efficient accomplishment of the mission. The advocates of merger erroneously assume that great size is automatically conducive to efficiency; and, therefore, advocate a concentration of administrative control at the expense of command authority in the hands of those responsible for end results.

"(b) That parallel operations in the various phases of procurement and other service functions are not per se unwarranted and inefficient duplication, but may well be conducive to great improvements in equipment and methods.

"(c) That complete integration of the service functions I have listed above does not necessarily insure reductions in overhead, savings in cost, reduction in the necessity for coordination, or increase in efficiency, but on the other hand, may easily lead to worse conflicts of jurisdiction, internal difficulties and confusion, and loss of direct contact and decisive action.

"and (d) That the efficiency of our combat forces would not be improved by consolidation of procurement and other service functions along the lines proposed.

"Organizations are made up of human beings, not of small rectangles outlined on a piece of paper. Almost any organization will work effectively, provided the people who compose it are imbued with enthusiasm, pride of organization, and the will to win by working together. Therefore, that organization which is most conducive to the development of such spirit and enthusiasm is the organization which should work best.

"The American temperament is stimulated by competition and by independence of thought and action. In practice, these are achieved by centralization of the determination of policy but decentralization of the execution of that policy.

"In considering the organization of our military forces, we must give great weight to economy but we must not permit economy to be the controlling factor. Expenditures for the military services are productive only to the degree that they contribute to the efficiency of those services in time of war. Expenditures for functions in the Army and Navy which appear to be and are, in fact, duplications may well be very productive by stimulating competition in development of personnel and material, and by instilling a pride of organization which will "pay off" in times of great stress.

"The most effective savings which we can make in financing our military services is to so equip them that they are strong enough to prevent wars and, if war does come, they can fight it to a successful conclusion."

"(a) From the beginning of consideration of the merger of the Armed Services I have been opposed to the thesis that merger is necessary simply because people who want the merger say it is necessary as distinguished from serious study and consideration of the pros and cons. I think we are all agreed that better coordination can be effected in some fields than existed during the war. As you must know, much has been accomplished along this line since the war. To accept, without critical examination, the views of high ranking Army officers, who are not the best qualified to pass on naval matters, that the military forces must be merged is to reject past experience, particularly that of Germany in World War II wherein many of its internal problems were clearly attributable to domination of the Navy by the Army.

"(b) I consider that H.R. 3469 as introduced by you on 14 May 1947 represents a satisfactory approach to solution of the problem. I consider also that the statement of Fleet Admiral E. J. King before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, S. 758 - National Security Act of 1947, and other testimony he has given as to merger, should be given careful consideration. It was my privilege to serve on Admiral King's staff on three separate occasions immediately before and during the war. If the lucid and intellectually honest position he takes in this matter is not given due consideration, we shall have failed to weigh evidence that is of the best.

"(c) You undoubtedly recall, perhaps some six months ago, an article on the subject of merger by George Fielding Eliot. His thesis was that a few years of patient and honest examination of what is needed is preferable to enactment of a hastily drawn bill which the Nation might live to regret. I believe also that he advanced the view that a Master in Chancery might well be considered. With these views I also agree. . . .

"(e) As to the opinion of the men of the service on this question, I have yet to talk to a naval officer who favors the merger in its present form. I am convinced that this opposition does not stem from the fact that the Army is the principal proponent of the scheme but rather from a conviction - the need for merger not having been demonstrated - that the Navy's obligations to the Country are far more important, and should be more convincing, than pressure, unsupported by logical presentation, constantly being exerted by proponents of merger. Put in other words, I feel - and have reason to believe that many others are of the same mind - that immediate merger as advocated would likely jeopardize rather than improve overall defense and security. I also have the impression that if the proponents of merger would devote the energies they are now expending in attempting to force it down the throat of the Nation to an all out effort towards better coordination of the machinery presently available, the need for merger would then not appear to be so great."

"Admittedly, there is need for more coordination, and cooperation, if you will permit me. My simple opinion is that a start in that direction should be made now by enacting legislation to provide departments and agencies concerning which there is full agreement on all but details of membership. Further study on controversial issues seems justified in view of sincere doubt as to their real benefit."

"It appears clear to me that whatever solution is made that there are two basic matters that must be established by statute:

- "(a) Air Power made the predominant force.
- "(b) The series of Boards, Councils and Agencies to coordinate and supervise the inter-relation of the State Department, Armed Forces and the civilian economy of the country to be activated.

"In regard to (a) above it is my conviction that it can be best accomplished by establishing a three department organization headed by a "Coordinator" as outlined in Section 101 of your bill. However, all military and naval aircraft and corresponding personnel must be a part of the Air Force; in any operation involving aircraft as the major offensive or defensive agent that the command be vested in the senior Air Force officer present. This is inevitable in time of war and therefore should be established as soon as possible so that the rough spots (and there will be plenty of them) can be worked out at leisure while the stakes are low. Further, this is the real long range intent of the Army Air Force, in my opinion, and the public opinion which gained them autonomy will compel a later re-work of the current problem if a partial solution is now effected."

"While strongly concurring in the purpose of both HR 2319 and HR 3469, I am convinced that if HR 2319 becomes law, there will be a wider separation of the various arms of the National Defense, less cooperation in command and administration and greater cost for a less effective, more cumbersome, military organization. The bill should be termed a "Separation" bill rather than a "Merger" bill. An additional and even more alarming probable result of this bill will be the gradual reduction of both the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation to impotent forces. This will result even though the mission of either or both of these services is written into the bill in general terms or in detail. It will be accomplished simply through the powers of the Secretary of National Defense to "finally determine the budget estimates of the National Defense Establishment" and control the budget program."

"I believe that a "Secretary of National Defense" with specifically defined authority would be more effective than a "Coordinator". The concept of a single military "Establishment", headed by a Secretary dealing with broad policy, assisted by department Secretaries to handle the administration of the departments, seems to me to provide a sound framework of authority, responsibility and administrative machinery."

"The idea of keeping the Army Air Force within the War Department by the method proposed in H.R. 3469 appeals to me. In fact, my personal opinion is that close integration of all Army Air with other Army elements, as has been done in the Navy, would be even better for our military efficiency if an amicable partnership could be established."

"As for a true merger (where all the services combine to a degree even comparable with the present merger of the sea, ground, and air arms now existing within the Navy) I am an uncompromising opponent. The degree of bureaucracy involved alone would spell disaster. But aside from such bureaucracy, the necessary "merger of thinking" does not exist and no head (civilian or otherwise) could eliminate the schisms which would exist within such a super-department. Furthermore, even if we assume a close meeting of all military minds and the absence of bureaucracy, the screening, channelizing and crystalization of military thinking resulting from a single Chief of Staff would deprive the Congress of one of its most vital functions. The President and the Congress must continue to guide and direct us. Clemanceau had good reason for his famous statement that: "War is too important to be left to the Generals".

"As for the so-called autonomy of the Air Force as represented by HR2319, I again find myself in opposition. Inevitably a separation into three departments will be more expensive, regardless of the many theoretical savings claimed. But of even more vital interest to our national security is the fatal blow this will deal to Naval Aviation. Inevitably every Air Force man would grow to look upon every dollar appropriated for Naval Aviation as a dollar out of his pocket. This would put Naval Aviation in a position of being an activity within a department which is fighting the full strength of another department.

"For the foregoing reasons I am convinced that any move away from the present two-departmental administration of our armed forces will be a step backwards not forward. The Army Air Forces have just fought a war under this system and it is an understatement to say that its performance compares favorably with the strategic bombing operations of other countries.

"I recognize the deep schism existing between the ground and air arms of the Army but I cannot see how this schism can be cured by further separation (the three-departmental system) or integration (the one-departmental system). Only patience, education and the fact that Air Power has come of age can rectify the mistakes of the past. I believe the bill that you have introduced follows this sound method of approach."

"It is my personal view that the Navy, as organized today, is well balanced and equipped to carry out its essential mission, that of control of the seaways vital to the defense of this country. Any law which might disrupt this balance, nor or possibly in the future, I would consider as jeopardizing the National Security. I, of course, realize that closer co-operation between the Army and the Navy represents increased efficiency and economy; but I believe the vital role that our Navy has played in the United States history, and the vital role the British Navy has, in the past, played in world history should not be lost sight of."

"I will say, however, that I fully realize the need for such coordination of the Armed Services as will adequately provide for team work between the Services both in peace and in war."

"In view of the wide divergence of views concerning the consolidation of the armed services and the necessity for realistic compromises, I cannot, in the time available offer a sound recommendation."

"At the risk of over simplification on a very complicated and controversial subject, it is my firm conviction that if there is created a separate Department of Air, Naval Aviation will be subjected to ultimate and inevitable strangulation, a similar trend will develop with regard to the Marine Corps, and organizational barriers will exist which will prevent the full realization of possible tactical air support for the Army Ground Forces.

"I believe that these possibilities are so real as to offer a threat to national security which will far outweigh the advantages of a three Department system. I am therefore definitely opposed to HR 2319 and favor HR 3469 in its stead.

"Regardless of the final bill which may be passed, your efforts to obtain and evaluate the views of responsible personnel on a broad basis are of inestimable value to the nation. So few people appreciate the fact that our national existence may be determined by the work that you are doing at this time."

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"It is a bit difficult to put down my specific objections to this conception of a National Security Organization, but I just don't like it. It gives too much power into the hands of a non-elective official. It would permit changes in composition and organization without sufficient knowledge of resultant effectiveness or ineffectiveness. It reduces the prestige of both Army and Navy, and thus also tends to lower morale and "esprit de corps", both of which are vital in fighting forces.

"I am in full agreement not to set up a separate air department. Such a separate department will be sure to increase the expense of the military requirements, for there is sure to be developed an organization as large as the War or Navy Departments.

"May you have success in your efforts to arrive at an effective national security structure for I believe you are on the right track, and more power to you."

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"I believe that the organization structure as set forth in HR 3469 more nearly meets the objections which have been raised against HR 2319. I feel your bill provides a more effective integration of all departments and agencies concerned with national defense. I prefer the title of Coordinator of National Defense, which I believe to be more accurately descriptive of the functions contemplated for this high office, to the title of Secretary of National Defense. In my opinion the coordinator should not be the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I feel it is unsound to make a civilian the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or give him membership since most all of the functions are strictly military. One of the greatest advantages of your bill (HR 3469) is its basic concept of a coordinated two department organization which is more sound than a three department organization. I believe in this concept 100% for the answer of our national defense problems.

"In diagramming your bill (HR 3469) in comparison with the organizational pattern of HR 2319, I think that in general the top of the pattern (composition of membership and flow of responsibility) is better in your bill HR 3469 with respect to the Coordinator for National Defense Council, National Defense Council, National Defense Resources Board, Central Intelligence Agency, Munitions Board, Research and Development Board, than in Bill HR 2319. I strongly feel that there should be a two department organization, Army and Navy with Air predominant in both by statute, with the ground forces and surface forces (excepting submarines) playing

roles. From the lessons we have learned from World War II it is shown that air will become increasingly predominant in the years to come. So I say to give it the place it so rightly deserves in the nation's military structure now. It has been said that no department of national defense should be in essence built around any specific weapon (airplane). I disagree as the airplane is not a specific weapon but is a carrier of many weapons."

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"I believe, therefore, that there is no more need for a separate Army Air Force than there is for a separate Navy Air Force. Each has its mission closely coordinated with that of the Army and Navy respectively, and their separation from those services would, to my mind, only tend to make coordination in time of war more difficult.

"My final recommendations are as follows:

"Make no change in present organization of War and Navy Departments with regard to merging same;

"Strengthen present coordination of activities of War and Navy Department by the Joint Chiefs of Staff;

"Add one more naval member to the present Joint Chiefs of Staff, this member to be the senior naval aviator on duty in the Navy Department; and

"Initiate a comprehensive study of supply problems of both Departments with a view to unification of control of certain features of their supply bureaus."

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"In regard to the Secretary of National Defense, I would much prefer that his duties of coordination be effected by a "Coordinator" or "Assistant President" or a "Deputy President" and that the Secretaries of the three services remain in the President's Cabine. It is basic and fundamental in our country that the military be subordinate to the civil authority. Therefore, it is highly desirable that the civilian head of each of the armed services be in a position strongly to present the requirements of each service without having to by-pass a Secretary for National Defense.

"It is my belief that the Air Force should be an integrated part of the Army (as in H. R. 3469). However, the Air Force has succeeded in breaking away from the Ground Forces and has convinced the vast majority of the citizens of our country that its importance warrants a separate Department. Therefore, the separate Air Force is acceptable to me and I have every belief that, once established, it will cooperate with the other armed services."

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"On the other hand the bill H. R. 2319 seems to me to have certain outstanding merits, which are the War Council, the provisions for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the three agencies for the coordination of national security, that is, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board. In summary, I would be relatively happy with H.R. 2319 were the Secretary of National Defense to be replaced by a Coordinator, leaving the three departmental secretaries as Cabinet members, or, if the Cabinet were enlarged by two, that is, the Secretary of National Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force."

"I consider that your bill H.R. 3469, provides a sound plan for national defense for the reason that it retains the two-department organization of the services.

"I am opposed to the establishment of a third department because I believe it is only natural that a separate air force or department will develop along lines of independent air action to the detriment of real coordination or cooperation between the army, navy and air elements of our armed forces. To me, it was apparent that the British RAF had developed on the concept that the air force would fight separately and independently of other forces and little interest was shown in the requirements of the army and navy for air support or in the development of suitable equipment for the execution of these vital functions. This was particularly apparent in the lack of development of carrier aircraft, or for that matter, of carriers themselves."

"I know the purpose of your letter was to elicit a perfectly frank statement from me on this subject and I believe, as between the two plans, H.R. 2319 will be productive of better results than your plan as contained in H.R. 3469."

"I do not believe that the central coordinating agency should be in the form of a Secretary of National Defense as set forth in H. R. 2319. This belief is not based on the fear of lodging too much power in one individual. It is based on the belief that no one individual has the capacity to absorb the mass of data that must be considered before a vital decision affecting the National Security can be made. It is my belief that such vital decisions should be made only by the President after consultation with a group of experts who have made a complete study of the problem.

"In my opinion the Organizational Outline under Titles I and II of H. R. 3496 is more appropriate, in establishing the coordination and control required, than is H. R. 2319. H. R. 2319 gives the Secretary of Defense power of decisions in the War Council. H. R. 3496 places the power of decision in the President.

"I sincerely believe that no appreciable savings in funds will be realized from the establishments of a separate Air Force or by combining the Marines with the Army. The particular job to be done will require the same funds, material and personnel in accomplishment, regardless of the Organization assigned to perform the mission. Certain specialized equipment and personnel will be required for special (or different) types of warfare."

"Present legislation before the Congress to unify the Armed Services (H.R. 2319) fails in its purpose for several reasons. In the first place, it is anachronistic to approach unification by creating a third department, namely the Department of the Air Forces. At a time when integration and coordination should be the result which we are seeking, the initial step is a decentralization followed by a superimposing of an all-powerful secretary over the two present departments and the new third department. Organizationally this process is unsound. Another feature which should make this bill undesirable is the failure to provide safeguards for the Marine Corps and Naval Aviation at a time when senior officers of the Army and the Air Forces have committed themselves in writing as to their concept of the future roles of both of these Naval branches. But even if this

safeguard were written in, there is still the possibility of a future change. Take for instance the case of Naval Aviation. Should a separate Air Force be established, it is only natural to suppose the nation as a whole would consider this department to be the authority on military aviation. In due course this department could and probably would point out to Congress in future budget hearings that two air forces are expensive, that the Air Force can perform all the missions of Naval Aviation and that there is no longer a necessity for that branch. Today's Navy without its integral arm, Naval Aviation, is no longer an effective weapon in modern warfare. Consequently, the logical conclusion to be reached is the final relegation of the entire Navy from a fighting force to a seagoing service force supporting the overseas movements of the Army Ground Forces and the Air Force.

"In conversation with officers of various rank in the Army Air Forces, their one obsession is to get free of the Army Ground Forces. They feel that through the years the best interests of the Air Forces have not been served by the Army, which I am forced to admit is true. However, as much as I sympathize with their views, and as much as I realize that their ambitions will be realized in an autonomous Air Force, I cannot subscribe to the belief that such a move is in the best interests of the National Security. Today we have two well-functioning departments with Naval Aviation as an integral part of the Navy. The same should be true of the Army Air Force and the Army. And to those of the Air Force who believe that air would not be properly recognized, I say that it is inevitable that those officers schooled in air warfare, sea warfare and land warfare will by necessity gravitate to the high command of the Services. When that occurs, we will have then the most efficient fighting force in the world, a complete Army and a complete Navy, thoroughly indoctrinated in the principles of all kinds of modern warfare. And the quickest, most efficient way to accomplish this is within a two-department defense system, coordinated as indicated in your bill. I might add that to quiet the few of those who fear the power of non-electoral coordinator, the duties of that office might well evolve upon the Vice President."

"Originally, being somewhat in doubt as to whether these matters were really settled by the proposed legislation (H.R. 2319), I was uncertain as to whether or not it was a good enough answer to the problem. Finally, however, I concluded that the need for definite action of some sort was so great, and that H. R. 2319 came so close to being the best that could be hoped for in the way of fair handling of the disagreements that have militated against unity, that it ought to receive early and favorable legislative action."

"I am opposed to the bill for a variety of reasons. My main objection, however, is based upon the fact that history is replete with examples of nations that have adopted a single, or unified, air force with disastrous results. The Naval component of that force has invariably been relegated to a secondary position; assigned officers, men, and materiel of such inferior quality and in such limited numbers that the result has been that it has been reduced to impotence.

"As noted above, the foregoing is my major objection to the bill. Additionally, I do not understand how the proponents of this bill can claim economy as one of its accomplishments; I am not a student of Government, but I do not see how the passage of the bill can fail to do anything but add tremendously to the cost of the Nation's armed establishment."

have given a lot of thought to the problem of consolidation of the Armed Services. I am opposed to the plan proposed in H. R. 2319. Practically every person with whom I have discussed the question is unalterably opposed to this plan. Although I must say in fairness that there are undoubtedly some in the naval service who think that H. R. 2319 is an acceptable plan, I do not personally know of anyone who favors it except the top administration of the Navy Department. I also feel sure that there are many people in the Army who are opposed to the present plan but, in view of the administration's support I think it would be very difficult to get them to express their views in other than an off the record manner.

"The fundamental faults of H.R. 2319 are: (1) a unification or merger into a single establishment in fact; (2) a single super-secretary of practically unlimited powers; (3) relegation of the service departments to a secondary place in the National Defense Establishment; and (4) the creation of a separate Air Force. To so radically change the organization of our Armed Forces at the present time is not only unnecessary, but also is actually dangerous to our National Security. Certainly creating a third department will not promote economy.

"Rather than go in to a lengthy discussion of H. R. 2319 I am enclosing a copy of a study on an organization for national security, together with the draft of a bill to implement it, that is I believe sound. It, incidentally, is very similar to your bill H. R. 3469."

"Both H. R. 2319 and H.R. 3469 appear to fulfill the requirements of providing an agency under the President for coordinating the efforts of the various branches of the Armed Forces. The major defects of H. R. 2319, in my opinion, are as follows:

"(a) The Secretary of National Defense appears to have too much power, particularly over the budget.

"(b) The functions of the Services are not defined in the Bill.

"Personally, as previously stated, I see no good reason for separating the Army Air Force from the Army. But this appears to have been accomplished, practically, already, and it is in accord with the general trend throughout the world. My principal objections to this step are the reduction of the Naval weight in the councils of our national defense from 50% to 33 1/3%, the greater difficulty of effecting real unity of command, and the danger of attempted interference by Army Air with the Naval Air and its proper function.

"I further regret to see the Secretary of Navy (and War) lose cabinet status.

"To summarize, I believe that H.R. 2319, as amended in accordance with the aforementioned TIMES article and amended further to include the definition of the functions of the Armed Services, as contained in the proposed Executive Order submitted with the Joint War-Navy Agreement of January 16, will afford a satisfactory solution of the problem of coordinating the Armed Services. I believe further that this opinion is probably shared by the majority of other naval officers. The greatest apprehension has been the fear that the Army might appropriate functions which properly belong to the Navy, that the Army Air Force might attempt doing away with or greatly decrease the Naval Air Force, and that the Marine Corps might be abolished or reduced to relative impotence. I believe that the Bill, modified as stated, would provide adequate protection against these possibilities."

"I am in favor of the merger bill now under consideration by the Congress (HR2319). I have only slight misgivings relative to the power given the Secretary of National Defense because I have confidence that the man appointed to that important office, assisted by his War Council, would impartially utilize all of the armed Services in the best interests of our country. I believe the proposed structure can be effective, efficient, and economical."

"One very simple approach to reducing the effectiveness of any particular service is through the Budget. It is better to have someone connected with the services establish an overall budget and a budget for each service than to have the present national Budget Officer state that there will be a certain percentage cut across the board, regardless of the needs of any particular service. A "Secretary of National Security" can serve a very useful purpose in this regard as well as in the broad policy field."

"Militarily there is no need for either an over-all Secretary of the Armed Forces or for a separate air force. Economy alone speaks forcibly against the establishment of additional bureaus, departments or agencies within the armed forces organization, especially when they add nothing to the national security, but, on the other hand tend to weaken the military establishment. Our experience has clearly demonstrated the necessity of integrating the air power of both the Army and the Navy within those services. Economy and coordination between and within the services can be accomplished by joint committees without the additional overhead of an administrative organization with a secretary to exercise control over and direct the military services."

"My personal opinion as to the merits of H.R. 2319 happen to coincide with the opinions so ably presented by General Vandegrift at your committee hearings. I see no objection to some form of a merger of the Armed Services, provided such a merger will affect the economy and efficiency of operation. I am concerned as a Marine Officer in seeing that my Corps does not lose its identity nor have its traditional functions curtailed or completely eliminated by this proposed legislation. The suggested change in language proposed by General Vandegrift, which I have just read in the current Army-Navy Register, would, if enacted, insure against any such possibility."

"Referring to question 1(b), the suitability of H.R. 2319 to accomplish the purposes outlined above, I doubt it. Doubtless it could be amended to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraph 3(b), (c) and (d), relative to Marine Corps and Naval Aviation in particular. Probably, it could be amended to define more specifically powers for the Secretary of National Defense. Admiral Nimitz is reported to have stated that if Congress feels H. R. 2319 should be so amended, "he certainly would have no objection".

"Regarding question 1(c), suitability of your alternate bill, H.R. 3469, in my personal view it would be preferable although certain amendments might be desirable. Objections to it have been raised that it does not provide: (a) a War Council; (b) a Single Secretary with adequate power of decision; (c) definite provision for integrating appropriations for all services; (d) inclusion of military membership in National Defense Resources Board; (e) a separate Air Force.

"In my opinion, the natural and inevitable result of the establishment of a third department within the single department of National Defense will be the eventual elimination of Naval Aviation and the U. S. Marine Corps. If the Public and the Congress believe this will better provide for National Security it is their prerogative and duty to decide and act accordingly. I submit that the Public should not be deceived as to what is taking place however. Nor, in my opinion should the issue be confused by claims regarding economy. The criterion here is the effectiveness as a National Security measure."

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"If it has now been determined by the Congress that the President's Cabinet, for whatever reasons, is incapable of coordinating effectively the departments of the Government including the Military Services, and therefore find it essential through legislation such as H.R. 2319 or H.R. 3469, to insure coordination not only of the Military Services, but of this country's entire economic and manpower potential for atomic warfare, then I favor, at least for the foreseeable future, a bill such as H. R. 3469 rather than H.R. 2319.

"I do not subscribe to the creation of a separate autonomous United States Air Force. Human nature being what it is, I believe that this would inevitably spell the doom of Naval and Marine Aviation under the guise of "economy" and "elimination of duplication". These two catch by lines have a great appeal during peace, and are used to railroad through measures which would take the tools from the hands of persons responsible for missions in war."

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"What I fear, however, is that passage of H. R. 2319 would result eventually in a weakened naval establishment lacking naval air units to conduct anti-submarine warfare and protect naval task forces, with no comparable Air Force units capable of performing these missions. The present Army Air Force has little conception of the problems connected with operations involving close coordination with naval task forces, and is not likely to exert sufficient effort, time, and funds to prepare units for these specialized assignments."

"With regard to H. R. 3469, I concur in general with the provisions of the bill, but I believe the choice of the title "Coordinator of National Defense" was unfortunate. In many quarters there is a certain onus attached to the term "Coordinator". I can see no need for any title other than "Chairman, National Defense Council". There are many who believe the duties of the office should be assigned to the Vice President when we have one. I think that is a good idea, but might require a constitutional amendment."

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"In the various comments which I have seen, I have been most impressed by the testimony of Fleet Admiral King and Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, and I definitely recommend that most serious consideration be given to their testimony and recommendations, particularly that testimony recently given before the Senate Committee."

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Approved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP90-00610R000100020007-8

"We're being hurriedly set-up, when we have just fought the greatest war in the history of the world successfully with a set-up which has been the subject of argument, experiment and improvement since the birth of this nation. And now, of all times, we are trying to change a proven system in such a manner that our national security may be very seriously jeopardized. For at least 5 years, and more likely, 10 years, what we know about warfare and the tools we use therein will be very similar to World War II. Great changes are inevitable and we have the machinery now to ensure their efficient usage, coordination and development. We should maintain that system until another system is proven better. I say that we have no right, no basis, for such change now though definitely, I do believe that certain changes are in order. Those changes, however, are in general agreement among all services and are based on war experience. They deal primarily with procurement, command functions, etc. These changes, together with the majority of organizational changes envisioned in the National Security Act of 1947, most people heartily agree to. Therefore, let's adopt these changes forthwith. Let's function under these changes for a couple of years, at least. Then, let's see where we stand."

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"I have been deeply concerned over the proposed unification ever since it came to my notice in the fall of 1945. I am still apprehensive over the results to the Navy and the Nation. I am opposed to the H.R. 2319 for the following principal reasons:

"(a) I believe that the political and military powers accruing to an office of such magnitude are too great for any non-elected official of the government.

"(b) I consider that too much is left to chance in that the authority of the proposed Secretary over the various Departments is not clearly defined.

"Regarding H. R. 3469 I favor this or a similar bill except that I believe the Coordinator of National Defense should not be included in the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in his stead the Chief of Staff to the President as is the present practice."

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"In response to your letter of May 27, 1947, I must say that your proposed bill, H. R. 3469, comes nearer to my idea of the 'merger' or 'unification' than anything as yet suggested.

"I like the two-department idea with autonomy for the 'Army Air Force.' I'm fearful lest under H. R. 2319, irrespective of the safeguards for Naval Aviation, that our country might be deprived of what I consider its mobile weapon namely, the aircraft carrier capable of launching long-range bombers, or guided missiles from any of the waters of the earth into the heartland of our prospective enemy.

"I believe I can state that practically all contemporaries of mine are very apprehensive about the pending merger legislation, and hold views similar to mine."

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"As for my general comment on the proposed consolidation, I am personally in agreement with the official position of the Navy Department."

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"In general, I believe that I am accurate in stating that most of the experienced naval officers, who have had no responsibility for the drafting of the consolidation plan, believe that it will do the Navy and the National Defense irreparable harm. This belief stems from the following:

"1. There is too much power vested in the Secretary for National Defense.

"2. While the overhead in connection with the Office of the Secretary of National Defense, as drafted in H. R. 2319, is modest, in a bureaucracy, the functions of an office have a habit of growing beyond all belief.

"3. The duties and functions of the various armed services are not definitely drafted and delimited in the plan.

"4. The duties and responsibilities as well as the strategic employment of the Navy, if not directly controlled, will be too strongly influenced by the military.

"Other than the above comment it would appear that H. R. 3469 is a much more practical plan to achieve coordination than H. R. 2319."

"That what I may say may not be constructive is to be regretted, since it is so easy to find flaws in any positive course of action yet so difficult to put forward something better. In this case, however, the issue is so important I feel entirely unsympathetic to the apparent widespread belief that any course is better than none. The safety of the country is dependent on the decision in this issue. It is disturbing to me that a precipitant course is to be followed when there are such divergent views on the matter held by the services who in the end must implement any decision that may be adopted.

" A merger at the top with the establishment of another autonomous arm will not in my mind result in economy. We may not spend more but I doubt we will spend less. The handling of budgets will essentially be unchanged since they at present are channelled through an executive office responsible to the President.

"As for H. R. 2319 and H. R. 3469, I consider your bill much the preferable of the two since I believe some of the thoughts above are already incorporated therein."

"If I recollect correctly, and I believe I do, the original basis for all this discussion, so far as the public was concerned, was unification wherever overlapping functions existed in order to effect economies in our national defense and to provide for unified command in Washington. As I have followed this matter through the press and the reports of the hearings, it seems to me that the current proposed legislation has drifted quite far afield from the original concept. Economies will not be effected by the super control agencies which are proposed and in securing a so-called unified command in Washington we will establish a General Staff system, the danger of which is very apparent if one studies German military history."

"I am going to state in the beginning that I like the two-department system, outlined in your HR 3469, and have never cared for the three-department setup of HR 2319. I make this statement based on what I have seen.

"I realize that I have been rather critical of the formation of a third independent department, that of Air, in this country. My remarks are not intended to be critical of our present Army Air Force. While I am product of the Navy-Marine Corps system, I had the opportunity of attending the Army Air Corps' tactical school at Langley Field in 1930. There I became friendly with many of the leaders of the Army Air Force today. Also I served with, under and over units of the Army Air Force in the South Pacific during the past war. I never saw an Army Air Force Officer that I didn't like personally; they are the same as anybody else. However, I do not believe that their case for independence, as outlined in HR 2319, is justified or for the best of this country. I believe that their future activities are amply protected in your HR 3469."

"I consider HR 3469 as far more desirable than HR 2319. HR 3469 maintains the two-department system and, in my opinion, fully provides for the Air Corps by giving it autonomy within the War Department. While there is some doubt that the office of the Coordinator of National Defense, which would be established by HR 3469, would have satisfactory standing and prestige in dealing with the various Cabinet members and others in the proposed National Defense Council, it is believed that this organization would be far superior, and would insure better coordination of the services, than the three-department organization under a single Secretary of National Defense.

"There appears to be a widespread fear, in which I share, that if HR 2319 is enacted, the other services will be reduced to minor proportions and status by budgetary action once the air force has been established as a separate department. While this undoubtedly arises partially from self-preservation and the fear of officers in the services that their careers will arbitrarily be cut short, it also arises from a real fear for national security. Nothing has been presented, other than extravagant statements, to prove that the merger will result in a better and more economical organization of national defense, while there are indications, based on war experience, that it actually will be inferior because of expected domination of one service over the others. Nothing that has appeared in reports of testimony at hearings held on HR 2319 have served to dispel this fear which has become aggravated by the public statements during the past year of various Army Air Force officers.

"I know personally no officer who does not subscribe to the views expressed above."

"Despite the fact that the present uncertainty regarding the merger of the armed forces is adversely affecting the general morale of the services, it is believed that the Congress must not rush this matter through until it receives more information from operational personnel. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that experienced naval aviators, general line, and staff corps officers of the rank of commander and above be summoned fresh from operational units of the Fleet outside the Washington area to testify before the pertinent committees of the Congress. Cross examination is the age old method of obtaining the truth and in my opinion it is the best.

"The remarks of many Air Corps officers to the effect that it was only a question of time before they would take over Naval Aviation; the plans the Army has for the Marine Corps which have been so ably brought out by General Vandegrift; and such reports as the Kirk plan which recently came out in which the Army made clear its intent to combine all medical services under them and the Lutes' report on logistics, all tend to make the Navy very suspicious of their Army compatriots."

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"I do not like the power placed in the hands of the Secretary of National Defense by H. R. 2319, particularly as regards control of the budget and power of decision in the War Council. I doubt if our country is ready to place this much power in the hands of one individual other than the president. The difficulty of finding a man competent to handle this job properly will be very great.

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"As to the Army Air Forces, I see no particular objection in setting up the Strategic Air Forces as an independent agency, in view of the fact that this force operated as an independent agency during the last war. I feel that the Army should keep its ground support aviation under Army control, similar to Navy aviation. However, the Army, as far as I know, does not appear to be interested in this matter as I have not seen or heard any discussion of it."

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"Many Naval officers feel that the representatives of the Navy Department who finally acceded to the Bill (H.R. 2319) did so because they felt that some sort of a unification bill would be forced upon the Navy, and that the proposed Bill was the best compromise obtainable. I believe that the Navy representatives do not think that Bill (H.R. 2319) contains the best possible provisions for the security of the United States, but that they think this is the best that can be done, considering Army Air's attitude and the effect of the prolific publicity which Army Air inspired. Everybody in the Navy realizes the very bad effects that these inter-service fights have on the morale of the personnel of the Navy, and probably of the Army too. It may be better to accept a decision which is not quite right and raise the morale, than it would be to continue to struggle with the ensuing demoralization of our combat personnel.

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"Also, Naval officers do not understand why, if unification is so desirable, that autonomy of the Air Forces is necessary. The two ideas are conflicting.

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"I believe that H. R. 3469 is a better alternative than H.R. 2319, but I would like to reiterate that legislation alone will not restore the Navy's former high regard for the intentions for Army Air. This can be done only by the future actions of Army Air."

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"If the powers of the proposed Secretary of National Defense were properly circumscribed and the necessary protection for the Marine Corps written in, I would not oppose its passage. Your proposed alternative, H.R. 3469, seems to have taken care of my first objection very well, but I was disappointed to see that it did not include a statutory delineation of the functions of the Marine Corps."

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"The effects of H. R. 2319 and its companion measure S. 758, if enacted into law, will be most profound; and I am personally apprehensive that some of the results will not benefit the Navy. I believe with you that it is the most important measure to come before the Congress, with respect to our National Security, and it should receive such serious consideration that the language of any law passed will in no measure impair the confidence and interests of the Navy.

"I most certainly agree that the closest coordination between operations of the Army, Navy and Air Forces should be provided for; but I am not sure that unification, even by law, is a magic word that will bridge all difficulties. I do not believe in a single Secretary for National Security, except in the role of Coordinator and Assistant to the President for National Security Matters. I do not believe that he requires cabinet status and I am personally opposed to any loss of cabinet status by the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Army.

"I will not comment upon the propriety of setting up the Army Air Forces as a separate Air Department, co-equal with the Army and Navy, beyond the statement that unification should begin at home and the creation of a separate Air Department seems to me a poor solution for failure to integrate the Army Air Forces into the Army.

"In addition, I am impressed that the original move for merger of the Armed Services, with creation of Air Department, was generated almost entirely from War Department sources. It is true that merger is being softened into unification, to which term it is more difficult to object; but I question the necessity of the steps proposed to obtain unification and coordination. I believe that the measures proposed are not essential to unification and I feel that they discount the morale and esprit de corps of the Navy and the Marine Corps, the priceless and necessary ingredients in the success of those organizations.

"I am afraid that unification in the form proposed will lead to an Army-dominated Navy and Marine Corps. I shudder at that thought when I think of the army dominated navies of Germany and Japan, and even of Russia and France. I am told that I discount the morale and spirit in the Navy and Marine Corps when I express the fear of Army domination; but my reply is that the elements for such domination exist in the proposed National Security Organization and we should not be subjected to a set-up that even requires efforts and thought to prevent Army control and development of naval services.

"There are many good features in the proposed legislation and they should be provided for by law and retained. The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, if a separate Air Department is created, should all be Cabinet officers. A Civilian Coordinator for National Security as a Deputy, or Assistant, to the President should be created; a War Council should be provided as indicated, with the Civilian Coordinator as Chairman and where top decision is required it should come from the President in his Constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief after obtaining recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the War Council; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and the Research and Development Board should be retained with suitable staffs and secretaries. Further, for national security there should be provided a National Security Council, a National Security Resources Board, and a Central Intelligence Agency as generally indicated, allowing for the differences indicated above.

"The above proposals are little different from your measure H. R. 3469, and I believe it could be modified easily to assure the features mentioned. Personally, I rather favor

your idea of giving autonomy to the Army Air Forces, but under the Army organization, similar to our Marine Corps in the Navy set-up. Naval aviation should be kept integrated with the Navy, and the Marine Corps organization should be maintained. The War Department should be changed to the Department of the Army and its Secretary designated as the Secretary of the Army."

"However, in regard to H. R. 2319, I note that the Secretary of National Defense is given the authority to 'establish policies and programs', and, 'to exercise direction, authority and control'. These powers are extensive. It seems to me that with this bill, the question is - how is it to be interpreted and administered? It would be the many rulings based upon such legislation which might lessen the effectiveness of one Service. Such interpretations made by the Single Secretary would have the effect of law in so far as the Services are concerned. A policy, program, ruling or interpretation effected by the Secretary over the objections of one Service would be difficult of correction, and much harm could be done, particularly, before such action could be overtaken by corrective measures taken by the Congress or by Executive action. Functions could be transferred, one by one, from one Service to another, leaving the former impotent. On the other hand, I believe the duties laid down for the 'Coordinator', as presented in your proposed bill, H. R. 3469, would accomplish the results desired as to coordination, effectiveness and economy and at the same time, prevent the possibility of arbitrary action by one man, to the detriment of the National Security.

"As for the Army Air Force, everyone agrees that they did a fine job in their contribution to the winning of the recent war. However, I do not believe that they would have been more effective had they been organized under a separate Department. With the advent of the guided missile and other new implements of warfare, conditions of warfare will continue to change. Guided missiles can be launched from the ground, from ships and from aircraft. The introduction of the guided missile and other implements of warfare, will, in the future, tend to reduce the relative importance of the piloted aircraft (including the Strategic Air Force) as it now exists. I believe that the War and Navy Department structures proposed in H.R. 3469 would promote desirable coordination and further, that the results would be more effective. On the other hand, I do not believe that it would be economical to provide for a separate Air Force."

"Briefly, I favor (1) the continuance of the two Departments, with coordinating agencies, and without the addition of a third Department of the Air; and (2) each with its air component becoming increasingly predominant as the parent department's other components become sublimated, in accordance (a) with lessons of the past war, and (b) with predictions as to future methods of warfare. Such an organization of two departments can more effectively, more economically and with greater facility perform the functions spelled out for three department organizations.

"Hasty perusal of your proposed bill, H. R. 3469, indicates that you entertain similar ideas and I heartily endorse its basic principles.

"Aside from the obvious military disadvantages in attempting to coordinate and correlate the activities of three separate departments as compared with two departments, I am unable to visualize the economies to be effected by organizing a third department, that of air, as proposed in H.R. 2319. It appears to me to be an expensive horse-trade move: The Air Force gets full independence and departmental status, the Army and Navy lose theirs.

get perpetuation of their waning organization. The Navy--an innocent bystander--gets temporary guarantees of no dismemberment of its Naval Aviation by one horse-trader and no dismemberment of its Marine Corps by the other trader.

"There are those who argue that organization of a Department of Air is due recognition of the distinguished services of our Air Forces during the recent war. With no thought of belittling their splendid performance, I consider appropriate recognition of the magnificent services of the Air Forces is obtainable, at less cost and without sacrifice of national security, by suitable reorganization within the War Department, granting the air component the predominating position therein to which it is entitled."

"Only time can give the correct answer to your question, but in my opinion the merger is worthy of a trial run, and somehow I am confident that it will wear well and improve as time goes on, despite its size."

"I fully agree with you that some steps should be taken in order to bring about a closer coordination of army, navy and air force operations. After a detailed study of the question I am sincerely of the opinion that the pattern of this step as expressed in S. 758 as amended and as reported to the Senate, represents a sound solution, the best that could be made to work -- in fact the most practicable which has been devised to date. I freely and fully support that bill as amended."

"The remaining provisions of the bill, establishing the three military departments and the Secretary of National Defense are far more controversial. For many years I have opposed the ideas of either a separate or a united air force or air department, as being both unnecessary for and detrimental to our overall military efficiency. During the war, I was strengthened in this belief by military developments in those countries which had adopted the air force idea, notably Great Britain and Germany. An examination of these developments reveals certain serious dangers inherent in the separation of the air forces from the other arms, and indicates that if such separation is undertaken it must be accompanied by clearly defined safeguards to prevent fatal weakening of the army and the navy, and the overall military effectiveness. H. R. 2319, as originally introduced, does not include these safeguards. I understand that certain amendments along this line have been introduced by the Armed Forces Committee of the Senate; but, since I have not seen them, I am unable to comment on them.

"However, it seems to me that the over-riding consideration is to adopt some plan which will attract the loyal support of all the services. Without such support, no organization can produce the unity of effort which we must achieve. Because of the strong and sincere convictions on both sides of this question, it appears that the three-department plan provided in H. R. 2319 is the only one which can attract this vital support. I believe that two departments, each with its own air element, a sounder organization from a military standpoint; but an inferior plan, loyally supported is preferable to a better plan which would produce continuing friction and conflict between the services. For this reason, it appears wisest to adopt H. R. 2319, which has the support of all responsible officials of both departments, provided it is amended to define clearly the functions of each department."

"I am a captain in the United States Naval Reserve on active duty. It is not in that capacity that I volunteer this letter but as a professional civilian, a newspaperman of sufficient Washington seniority to have become (for illustration) one of the elders of the Gridiron, and who was before the war head of a substantial news bureau in this city.

"My opposition to the Senate and House Committee versions of the Armed Services Unification legislation - Senate 758 and House 2319 - is therefore from the viewpoint of an informed civilian. There are not many of us, even in the Congress or in journalism, and outside those two categories the public is dangerously uninformed and, editorially, dangerously misinformed, of the threat to the national defense and indeed to the republican form of government inherent in these bills. For the public's ignorance I blame my colleagues of the press.

"You have tried to remedy the gravest danger by substituting a co-ordinator of the military departments for the fantastically empowered single Secretary delineated in the committee bills. If your amendment could be advertised and explained to the public I believe it would produce such popular support that that revision would be forced upon Congress.

"What the committee bills propose is to delegate to one man almost autocratic powers over the military establishments of the nation. The powers to be conferred upon him exceed those suggested by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and their military advisers.

"This legislation is not being written for the day, or the next five years. It can not be gaged by the personal statures of any likely candidate for the office this year or in 1949. It is to be the basic law for the administration of the national security structure for as far as we can see into the future.

"Who is this autocrat of our safety to be? He will be a man rewarded with the office for his assistance in winning the election for an administration. He will come to Washington charged with the responsibility not only of maintaining the nation's security but, to great extent, the peace of the world. The chances are good that he will be an earnest, zealous, loyal and ambitious public servant. The chances also are, by statistical evidence, that he will relinquish the office as soon as it interferes with his personal affairs. And the odds are that he will be as familiar with the enormous duties with which this Congress is preparing to charge him as I am about abdominal surgery or atomic energy.

"The inevitable result will be the domination of the composite department by the professionally military, in violation of the spirit of the Constitution, however the proposed law is adjusted to the letter of the charter.

"No one can plead, except speciously, that the same criticism applies to the President as commander in chief, or that the President's ultimate authority remains intact. The President is an elected servant of the people, a politically appointed Secretary is not. Under the existing system, the President's administration of the national defense is delegated to two Cabinet officers, thus halving the likelihood of malfeasance. The proposed law would double it, besides creating a self-perpetuating military staff in fact, although it may not so be called in name, as the mentor of the innocent in nominal charge. Will we not have a military bureaucracy, concealed from the public and beyond reach of the Congress?

"Without going into too infinite detail, I believe that the proposed unification -- which contains many desirable and necessary improvements on the existing defense structure -- contains all the germs of a militaristic organism which when

implanted in the body politic can cancerously overcome it. The law is being propelled to enactment by an hysteria produced by distorted images of approaching war. I can believe that the bill, if made law, might even hasten conflict and by the topheaviness of its creation, make that war costly and difficult to win.

"Reverting to the letter of the Constitution, what consideration has been given to the articles forbidding appropriations to the Army for more than two year? Will the entire defense budget under unification have to be placed under that time limit? The Constitution also says there shall be an Army and a Navy. Will not then the creation of a co-equal Air Force be technically unconstitutional? Is not your re-definition of the Army Air Force as analogous to the Marine Corps unconstitutionally compulsive?

"These are practical questions, not rhetorical ones, and the answers can not be evaded.

"The necessity of such integrating agencies as the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs and Central Intelligence, are in any event above debate, and can easily be established forthwith by non-controversial legislation. Their establishment by law is all the nation now needs for its coordinated security, until a completely objective, unhurried, scientific study of truly integrable defense can be accomplished.

Sincerely,
(signed) Walter Karig"

"I have not had the time to analyse the various provisions in the two bills, also I have been out of touch with naval developments in recent years. However, I like the declaration of policy in H.R. 3469. The detailed provisions of H.R. 3469 appear to conform to the declaration of policy and should provide for the coordination of the armed services without disrupting any of the organizations which have proved their effectiveness."

"I agree with you that close coordination of land, sea and air operations is absolutely necessary. In obtaining this coordination through the decisions of one man, I think the command of a theatre is the highest limit which can be expected of a human being even when advised by a well rounded joint staff. For this reason I am uneasy concerning the interests of the Navy when one man in Washington has the power to reduce the activities and functions of the Navy by means of adjustments within the overall security budget. History has repeatedly shown that few men other than those with Naval training understand the importance of control of the sea and just what is involved in the way of means and operations required to secure and exercise this control. The reports of the Fuehrer conferences now being published by the Navy Department are excellent examples of what happens to a Navy when under the overall direction of someone who does not understand control of the sea by sea-air power."

"Fleet Admiral King in his statement before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate on May 6, 1947 said, "I feel that in the controversies and discussions that have so far taken place (in relation to an improved organization for national security) the emphasis has been wrongly placed; that, so to speak, the cart has been put before the horse". To me this is the essence of the present situation. Before the country, the Congress or the services had time to evaluate properly the results of the last war or the prospects of

the future insofar as both pertain to a proper organization for national security, we were plunged into a discussion of detailed organization which largely missed the main point. It is not so important to change the departmental organization of the military services themselves as it is to set up permanently and quickly the machinery which will enable this country to wage efficiently the total war of the future if it ever becomes necessary to do so. From a national security standpoint our most pressing need of the moment is an agency which will coordinate and tie together all those activities of government which have to do with the political, the military, the economic, and the industrial factors involved in the "common defense".

"As to the reorganization of the military departments themselves, it is my feeling that by a process of evolution and real inter-service education a truly single service might become a probability within a generation. Any such solution will of necessity have to await the arrival in command ranks of military and naval men who are now starting their careers and who, properly trained, can assess each others problems with an understanding which is most certainly not existent at the present time.

"As an ~~inter~~ organization I am unalterably opposed to the proposal for three military departments contained in H.R. 2319. It is organizationally unsound from a military standpoint because it would freeze the services into the pattern of World War II. At a time when every prospect of the future indicates a necessity for a simplified and economical structure, it establishes an organization which multiplies, complicates and one which will strain the financial resources of this country to maintain. Money badly needed for real military needs will be used for a greatly enlarged departmental structure and overhead.

"The crux of the matter in this respect is of course the demand of the Army Air Forces for autonomy. Without this demand, we could proceed with an orderly coordination of the two services on an economical basis and ultimately to a single service.

"There is nothing, military or otherwise, that cannot better be accomplished by two departments, as against three. In so far as air is concerned, and I consider myself qualified to speak, I feel that at the moment, as of today, the Air Forces of the Army and Navy are the most essential offensive and defensive components of our military strength. Nothing should be done to weaken them in any way and "air mindedness" must continue to be a requisite in all military and naval planning and thinking. However, if the Army Air Forces attain separate departmental status, it is my belief that they will tend to become frozen in an outmoded pattern due to lack of competition. They will soon become the only Air Forces of the United States for I am certain that the Naval Air Forces cannot long maintain their present status and efficiency vis a vis a separate Air Department. Without air, the ground army and the surface navy, still able to exert tremendous influence, will tend to become completely reactionary in their efforts to maintain their own size and prestige.

"To my mind there is less reason for a separate department of Air, now, than there was 25 or 30 years ago when proponents of such action were just as strong in their convictions and used many of the same arguments to back up their contentions. Had they had their way then, there would have been no Naval Air Forces in this war. This however is history, certain details of which will become more generally appreciated as better histories of World War II become available. What concerns us as a nation now is the future. What of the future of military Air? No one knows exactly, but in this connection I invite your attention to Dr. J. C. Hunsaker's letter transmitting the 32nd Annual report of the NACA to the President, dated January 10,

1947 wherein he says - 'The close of the war marked the end of one whole phase of development of the airplane as conceived by the Wright brothers. The airplane in its present form is no longer a sound basis for future planning for the national defense'. This does not mean that the strategic bomber is obsolete as of today but it does mean it is obsolescent as a type. It also means that air warfare of the future will bear little or no resemblance to the air warfare of World War II.

"My personal recommendation for an immediate solution to the problems involved in improving our organization for national security would be a coordinated two department establishment with adequate and positive safe guards for the air forces of each department. Such an organization could be relatively simple and economical. What is more important, it could be made to lead to the eventual and ideal establishment of a single service. It would also have the major advantage of maintaining within the ground army and the surface navy the air mindedness which is so essential to each at this time.

"H. R. 3469 more nearly approaches my ideas than any bill I have seen. It contains certain provisions which I would like to see changed but I would take it 'as is' if it could be substituted for H.R. 2319 because I consider the latter so completely undesirable in its major features."

"However, the crux of the problem is whether or not to have one overall head, such as the Secretary of National Defense of H. R. 2319. This I consider would be inadvisable and unnecessary. I consider that not only is the proposed position too much of a task for one man, but also, and what is more important, it gives too much power to one man. I much prefer a continuation of the system of the Joint Chief of Staffs, which was employed during the war, with its checks and balances imposed by the fact that all decisions had to be unanimous.

"As for the opinion of the men in the service, I can speak only in general of my contemporaries with whom I have had contact - mostly officers of my rank. The opinion is against any unification, as we know it, i.e., with one supreme head over all the services. I believe that most everybody feels that progress can be made towards closer relationships between the services and that some functions can be consolidated, but that these questions should be a matter of evolution and not revolution."

"I agree fully with you 'that some steps should be taken in order to bring about a closer coordination of army, navy and air force operations'. However, after consideration of your alternative plan as represented by H. R. 3469, it is my opinion that it will not accomplish the desired coordination as well as the plan contained in H.R. 2319, or its companion Senate Bill S. 758, with amendments as recently reported. This latter plan as amended will I believe provide a sound workable plan under which the several services can operate."

"I firmly believe that a three departmental system for the Armed Services is the worst measure we can take to improve our National Security. Further, it is my considered belief that retention of the two Department system administered by the agencies proposed by Mr. Eberstadt, and eliminating separation of the Army Air Force, can be made a workable, efficient instrument of National Policy. A single Department is far more to be desired than three."

"Of the three means for promoting national security exemplified by H. R. 3469, H. R. 2319, and S-2044, which was considered by the last Congress, I prefer the type or organization proposed in H. R. 3469. I prefer it because it provides a National Defense Council which is the most important deficiency in the present security structure, because it continues the basic structure of the Armed Services which has proven successful in war, and because it provides additional means for reinforcing that structure by coordinating action."

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"To sum up briefly, it is my opinion that if it is necessary at this time to change the present military setup, it should be done with extreme caution. The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations have assured us that the bill, as proposed by the War and Navy Departments adequately protects the Navy's integrity, including the Marine Corps and Air Force. I accept their appraisal of the bill with the provisos as set forth in the preceding paragraph."

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"If a consolidation of the services is effected under the provisions of H. R. 2319, I am convinced that such action will lead to the eventual destruction of Naval aviation as it exists today. In doing so the Congress would be destroying one of the most potent weapons of the recent war. The integration of Naval aviation in the Navy had been accomplished over a period of years prior to the war, and I believe its record during the war speaks as complete justification for its continued existence. The fast carrier task force, as an example, was a development of integrated Naval aviation and its value as a powerful weapon cannot be questioned."

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"It is my opinion that the present plan, as supported by the Navy Department, has been thoroughly and intelligently considered from all angles by the various committees of the Navy Department."

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"I am strongly opposed to the provisions of H. R. 2319 establishing a separate Air Force. The experiences of Great Britain and Germany along such lines have so fully demonstrated the futility of the Air fighting an independent and uncoordinated war that I dread the possibility of such a policy being adopted by this country. If the amendments to H.R. 2319 protect us from such a danger, and protect the future operation and development of naval aviation, (ship and shore based) some of the disadvantages of HR. 2319 will have been overcome."

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"Militarily there is no need for either an over-all Secretary of the Armed Forces or for a separate air force. Economy alone speaks forcibly against the establishment of additional bureaus, departments or agencies within the armed forces organization, especially when they add nothing to the national security, but, on the other hand tend to weaken the military establishment. Our experience has clearly demonstrated the necessity of integrating the air power of both the Army and the Navy within those services. Economy and coordination between and within the services can be accomplished by joint committees without the additional overhead of an administrative organization with a secretary to exercise control over and direct the military services."

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"I am unalterably opposed to H. R. 2319 and the revised S. 758 as recently reported out of Committee, and my ideas are covered by some of the points included in your suggestions embodied in H. R. 3469.

"With regard to your question of opinion of men in the service, on the subject of Merger, Unification, etc., I am going to testify that from conversations with officers in the Naval Service over a long period, I can say that 99% of these were opposed to it. Just recently, I had the opportunity to take a poll of about two hundred officers assembled and of that number only two were in favor of it. This maintains my previous estimate of 99%."

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"In conclusion I should like to say that your plan appears to me to be much superior to the other. It leaves to each service the determination of what it needs whether it is in the air, ground or on the sea. It also retains for the Army its air arm which I think is necessary. Perhaps the best solution would be one such as we have with the Marines in the Navy; they are 20% of the size of the entire Navy. Perhaps 'air' in each service could operate on a fixed percentage in a similar manner."

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"Although H.R. 3469 contains interesting and novel features, I prefer S758 chiefly because I am of the opinion that the latter bill would stand a better chance of receiving the loyal support of the Armed Services. I am sure you will agree that without this support, coordination and unity of effort will be impossible.

"With regard to your inquiry concerning the opinion of the enlisted men in the Navy on unification, I believe that the majority are opposed to unification principally because they fear such a step might eventually result in domination of the Navy by the Army."

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"I have given the matter considerable thought and it is my belief that, under existing conditions, the latest draft of the bill which the departments are now supporting is the more favorable. It should provide both the required coordination and necessary safeguards. I believe that it would be a decided improvement over the existing situation."

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"It is my opinion that a third military department, as provided for in H. R. 2319, stems largely from the Army Air Force's desire for autonomy and should be more carefully studied for its effect upon the efficiency and effectiveness of our national defense system. I find it difficult to see how a third department with its necessarily large departmental organization and overhead can be maintained without a permanent increase in cost over that required for a two-department system. Furthermore, if a United States Air Force is established as a third department, it is reasonable to expect that this force, with its Chief of Staff holding relative rank and position with the Chief of Staff of the United States Army and the Chief of Naval Operations and sitting as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will not only speak through the Secretary of the Air Force for all Aviation but be generally recognized as the principle advisor and final authority on the development, procurement, maintenance and operation of all the Air resources of the United States, particularly so in the integration of the Aviation Budget. The inevitable result will be the relegation of Naval Aviation to a secondary or minor role without regard for the records of World War II in which the Navy, with an integrated air arm as its most powerful weapon, not only established and maintained control

of the sea but provided air as well as gunfire support for troops that were fighting beyond the range of Army tactical air support. It will be difficult to impose restrictions on a United States Air Force to protect Naval Aviation that may not later be removed as theory replaces war experience as the basis for military organization.

"The majority of officers with whom I have discussed the subject of reorganization believe that the best interests of the United States would be served by a two-department system with Air soundly integrated and playing a dominant role in each department. It is difficult to reconcile an independent United States Air Force which excludes Naval Aviation."

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"In your letter you asked also what I considered the opinion was of the men in the Navy regarding H. R. 2319. During the last several months I have talked with a great many officers of the Navy, both regular and reserve. I have been surprised to find so many of these men well informed on the subject of 'merger' or 'unification', and many of them are quite well acquainted with the details of the proposed legislation in H. R. 2319. All of the officers I have talked with are opposed to this legislation with the exception of two. I believe it can be said at least 90% of the naval officers are sincerely opposed to this proposed legislation. Included, of course, are the regular and reserve officers of the Marine Corps.

"H. R. 3469 which you inquired about in your letter, I believe is an improvement over H. R. 2319 if in fact there must be an overall law reforming and recasting our military organization. Personally, however, I much prefer to use great caution and consideration of all of the factors involved before remoulding and reorganizing the whole military and national security structure. It seems to me that it is much better to consider improvements on a step-by-step basis. In any organization so large as our military establishment, the necessity for improvement always is apparent. These should be made forthwith as they arise. At the present time, I do not see any reason or urgency for wide-sweeping reform legislation. To avoid disaster, caution must be controlling."

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"With regard to HR-2319, I believe that this bill does not properly solve the questions involved but rather accentuates them. It does not seem reasonable to me that required integration is to be obtained by separation of Army Air Forces from Army Ground Forces. On the contrary it appears rather evident that experience during the past war indicates strongly the need for closer integration, rather than separation of these elements. As to the question of political expediency, I can only say that if this be a prime factor then the safe-guarding of the National Interest is indeed in jeopardy.

"I view with considerable apprehension the creation of the proposed office of the Secretary of National Defense. It seems to me that, unless proper and adequate safeguards are written in the law, this office would tend toward such powers as would be improper for any single individual short of the President, and therefore is not a proper appointive office. Since this point has been raised many times no further elaboration is required here. A further point which I believe important is that the office would tend to channelize all new developments and to eliminate all traces of duplication, whereas a reasonable amount of competition and duplication is not only healthy but sound practice for prevention of stagnation."

"I am strongly opposed to the enactment into law of the National Security Act of 1947 for two basic reasons. First, I believe that this bill will set up an administrative structure out of which will evolve a military policy which will not meet the peculiar military situation of the United States. Next, I oppose the National Security Act of 1947 on the grounds that it is conducive to the establishment of a degree of military control over the Government of the United States which is not compatible with our democratic, constitutional form of Government.

"In my opinion the establishment of administrative parity of the Army Air Forces and the Army Ground Forces with the Navy of the United States will lead to a situation where the exponents of land, surface and air power will outweigh the exponents of naval, surface and air power in a ratio of 2 - 1. A logical outgrowth of this condition will lead to a situation where the seapower of the United States, including the air over those seas, is subordinate to its land power, including the air over that land. The realities of global geography make it clear that the control of the seas and of the air over the seas, which can only be exercised by naval forces, is now and will continue to be the primary factor in the defensive or offensive war which we will be required to conduct against our most likely enemy. If we control those seas and the air over them we will be able to interpose insuperable barriers against an attack through 80 per cent of the circle which we must defend. Admittedly, 20 per cent of that circle, that is the Polar route, may be defended by the Army Air Forces. If we control those seas and the air over them we will impose a decisive offensive threat against our most likely enemy through 80 per cent of the circle which she must defend. Admittedly, here again the Army Air Forces can impose a threat, though at much longer range, through 20 per cent of the circle.

"High powered propaganda has advanced the absurd theory that we no longer require a Navy because our most likely enemy has none. The enactment of this bill will create the administrative structure which may dictate a military policy under which the United States will cease to have that naval power. This propaganda has grown to such proportions that this nation is now considering the abandonment of sea power and air power over the seas as our first line of defense. It would have made as much sense for England to cease to be a sea power despite her dependence upon the seas, or for Switzerland to undertake to become a sea power despite her lack of access to the seas.

"With regard to my opposition to the National Security Act of 1947 on the grounds of its incompatibility with our democratic form of government, I am concerned with the extent to which that act places tremendous powers in the hands of an official who is not elected by the people. I am concerned with the extent to which this bill is supported by those who have always cast admiring glances at the power and influence of the German General Staff."

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"All Americans have an instinctive distrust of the concentration of command of total land and naval power in a single man. I share this distrust, in spite of the fact that I have been in the naval service since I was sixteen years old. Such power is too heady a wine for any man, no matter how competent and well intentioned.

"In times of peace the professional soldier and sailor must fight to avoid stagnation and solidification of his thinking in established grooves. Healthy competition and divergence of thought between services during these periods can help avoid this. For example, before the present war, there was a difference in opinion between the Army and Navy Air Forces concerning liquid cooled and air cooled engines. It is fortunate that this divergence occurred. Another difference which has recently developed, and which I think is a healthy one, is the marked difference between the Naval ROTC and the Army ROTC. If the integration of the Army and Navy had been so firm as to require each service to use the same officer training program, the new Naval ROTC could never have been developed and approved by the Congress. I have been intimately connected with the latter program and am confident of its continued success. However, even if it should prove wrong, I believe the fact that this method has been tried cannot do other than make for better officer training for both Army and Navy in the long-run picture."

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Cmdr. J. T. Blackburn
Adm. W. H. P. Blandy
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